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ABSTRACT
SPLITTING AND SELF- SCHEMATA
MAY 1996

JOSEPH A. BOUSQUET, B.S., FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

M.S.W., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Sheldon Cashdan

Two studies test the idea that the psychoanalytic

defense of splitting involves alternating activation of
global, opposing self -schemata,

including a good- self

schema, and a bad-self schema. Subjects were chosen on the

basis of scoring very low or very high on Sharon Gerson's
(1984)

Splitting Scale, allowing frequent splitters

infrequent splitters

(IS)

(FS)

and

to be contrasted on a variety of

experimental measures. Subjects were asked to rate their

schematicism on a variety of trait dimensions and to rate
two characters in a Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) card on
the same dimensions. They were also asked to judge whether

perceptibly and subliminally presented trait adjectives were
best characterized as me or not me.

Results indicate that IS identify themselves more

schematically than FS on the trait dimensions good, bad,
loving,

and hateful. FS showed longer average reaction

latencies in the me/not me judgment tasks, but there was no
vi

consistent evidence that either group enjoyed a speed

advantage in responding to trait terms of interest when
response times were standardized. These results suggest that
FS are not more schematic than IS on the trait dimensions

listed above.
On the other hand, FS did tend to differentiate TAT

characters more on the trait dimensions under study than

IS,

an indication that they projected split object relations

onto the neutral TAT stimulus card. FS also showed a greater

tendency to respond nonrandomly to the trait terms good and

loving when these were presented subliminally

,

suggesting a

greater degree of priming on these trait dimensions.
The mixed results suggest that although splitting
cannot be conceptualized in the schematic terms proposed at
the outset of the study, further research into differences
in the information processing advantages of FS on the trait

dimensions good, bad, loving, and hateful is warranted.
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CHAPTER

1

REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

In this chapter

I

discuss the Psychoanalytic concept of

splitting, distinguishing normal developmental splitting,

normal defensive splitting and borderline splitting.

I

then

propose links between splitting and research in social
cognition dealing with self -schemata and the complexity of
self -representations

Freud's Splitting of Consciousness

The modern concept of splitting has roots extending at
least as far back as Janet, who believed that classical

hysteria resulted from a splitting of the contents of
consciousness attributable to "an inborn weakness in the
capacity for psychical synthesis..."

(Freud,

1955a, p. 49).

In Studies of Hysteria, written between 1893 and 1895,

Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud also recognized a splitting
of consciousness in hysteria. They claimed that unlike the

everyday "psychical groups" of associated memories,
thoughts, and affects accessible from states of normal

consciousness, the split-off psychical groups of the

hysteric were accessible only within altered states of

consciousness--Freud's (1955a) so-called "hypnoid states".
1

In addition to the remarkable conversion symptoms Anna
0.

suffered, Breuer and Freud {1955, p. 24) described

...entirely distinct states of consciousness... which
alternated very frequently and without warning and
which became more and more differentiated in the course
of the illness. In one of these states she recognized
her surroundings; she was melancholy and anxious, but
relatively normal. In the other state she hallucinated
and was naughty '- -that is to say, she was abusive,
used to throw the cushions at people ... [and] tore
buttons off her bedclothes and linen.
There were
extremely rapid changes of mood.
At moments when her
mind was quite clear she would complain of the profound
darkness in her head, of not being able to think, of
becoming blind and deaf, of having two selves, a real
one and an evil one which forced her to behave badly,
and so on.^
'

.

.

.

.

Unlike Janet, for whom split consciousness was

essentially congenital, Breuer and Freud viewed it as a
secondary manifestation of a more basic defensive process:
In contradistinction to Janet's view, which seems to me
to admit of many and various objections, we have that
advocated by J. Breuer in our joint publication.
According to Breuer, the "foundation and condition" of
hysteria is the occurrence of peculiar dream-like
states of consciousness with diminished capacity for
association, for which he suggests the name "hypnoid
states." The splitting of consciousness is then
secondary and acquired; it occurs because the ideas
which emerge in hypnoid states are cut off from
associative connection with the remaining contents of
consciousness (Freud, 1955a, p. 49)

The reader may detect similarities here with more
recent descriptions of multiple personality and dissociative
disorders. Unfortunately, the theoretical relationship
between splitting, dissociation, and multiple personality
formation remains ill-defined a century after Breuer and
Freud's collaboration (e.g., Berman, 1981; Armstrong et al.,
'

1990)
2

In hypnoid states Breuer and Freud {1955, p. 12)

contended that:
...the ideas which emerge... are very intense but are
cut off from associative communication with the rest of
the content of consciousness. Associations may take
place between these hypnoid states, and their
ideational content can in this way reach a more or less
high degree of psychical organization.

Such splits were not necessarily complete or entirely

irreversible
The nature of these states and the extent to which they
are cut off from the remaining conscious processes must
be supposed to vary just as happens in hypnosis, which
ranges from a light drowsiness to somnambulism, from
complete recollection to total amnesia (Breuer &
Freud, 1955, p. 12)

Freud soon clarified that splitting of consciousness
was not a necessary outcome in hysteria. In The Defence

Neuro- Psychoses Freud argued that there were three types of
hysteria, only two of which resulted in split consciousness.

Hypnoid Hysteria, already discussed, involved split
consciousness secondary to hypnoid states. On the other
hand, Freud did not see split consciousness playing any

notable role in pure retention hysterias

,

in which the only

problem was nonresponse to a trauma, and for which simple
abreaction was considered a cure (Freud, 1955a)
As in the case of hypnoid hysteria, Freud's defence

hysteria did involve splitting of the contents of
consciousness, but here it was viewed as the

consequence of a voluntary act on the part of the
patient; that is to say, it is instituted by an effort
I
of will, the motive of which is discoverable. By this
do not of course mean that the patient intends to
3

produce a splitting of his consciousness; the patient's
aim is a different one, but instead of attaining its
end it produces a splitting of consciousness
(Freud,

1955a, p. 49)

This descriptions of defense hysteria anticipates a

very important aspect of the modern concept of splitting.
Where there is will, there is also a degree of
consciousness. As noted by Masterson (1976, p. 57), although
...the function of

[splitting]... is to keep contradictory
primitive affective states [and self and object
representations mutually linked with these affective states]
separated from each other.
both states remain in
consciousness but do not influence each other [italics
added]
.

.

This leads to an interesting point. With heavy,

continued use of splitting, there is a parallel development
of contradictory self -representations,

each involving its

own distinctive set of cognitive and affective components.

When one self -representation is activated, the other is deactivated. Being de-activated, however, does not mean it is

completely out of consciousness. To the contrary, a person
who is splitting is always at least preconscious of the de-

activated self -representation.
This makes splitting a rather shaky defense if the

purpose is to avoid awareness of conflict. People who use
splitting as a primary defense (e.g., borderlines), are

vulnerable to collapse of defensive capacity whenever
aspects of the currently de-activated self -representation is

brought to full awareness, thus conflicting with a current

contradictory self -representation
4

.

A typical secondary

defense, at this point,

is isolation of affect,

in which

affect is decoupled from cognition, resulting in denial of
the emotional significance of the cognitively acknowledged

contradiction (Kernberg, 1976)
Guided by the evolving topographic model, Freud soon
turned his energies to the study of repression, a more
efficient and adaptive defense than splitting of
consciousness. In contrast to splitting of consciousness,

repression produced true unconsciousness of unwanted aspects
of self or others,

while simultaneously permitting partial,

symbolic expression of whatever was repressed. Rather than
the parallel development of contradictory ego states and

self -schemata, repression permitted one to develop a much

more coherent sense of self.
Freud's decision to focus on repression was largely
strategic; by assuming that most mentally disturbed people

had intact egos (and, implicitly, singular conscious
selves)

,

Freud was able to push classical drive theory to

its limit. By the 1930s, however, many psychoanalytic

thinkers realized that some mental disorders- -what are now

considered character disorders, for example- -could not be

effectively treated using only strictly traditional

psychoanalytic methods. Once the problem was identified as
the lack of intact egos in these "unanalyzable patients,"

psychoanalysis became preoccupied with problems of ego
development
5

It was in this context that Freud expanded on the

original notion of defense hysteria, noting that ego could

divide defensively, with opposing memories, thoughts,
affects, and fantasies attaching to the part -egos. This

position, anticipating modern theories of splitting in the

so-called borderline character disorders, reflected Freud's

recognition that a defense operation could cause something
even more profound than analyzable neurotic symptoms --in
essence, a division of the self, or "ego-splitting"
1955b,

(Freud,

1955c)

Developmental

S plitting

Before discussing defensive splitting in adults, it
should be emphasized that most psychoanalytic thinkers

believe that normal childhood splitting plays a critical
role in the development of cognitive representations of self

and others
By 1921, Melanie Klein believed that at a certain point
in development young children split the internal psychic

representations of a parent in order to avoid premature

contamination of the "good parent" from less savory
representations of the same figure (Klein, 1950)
The child's inner world was considered to be as much a

source of potential negative associations with parental

representations as the real behavior of the parent. As Klein
6

(1955)

later proposed, projective identification, primarily

involving the splitting off and projection of the ego's
aggressive tendencies, was as central to the so-called
paranoid- schizoid stage of development as was splitting, per
se

Klein believed that in permitting the ego to retain a
central good object (the "good breast") around which it

could ultimately organize benign object relations, normal
infantile splitting paradoxically facilitated longer term
integration. Normal splitting gave the developing child

contrasting self -representations and contrasting object
representations with which it could unambiguously associate
any of the widely varying phenomeno logical experiences it
encountered. Thus, most of the child's experience could

remain obj ect- related
Klein saw such splits resolving dialectically in a
normal developmental course. Normal splitting bought the

developing ego time to mature to a point at which its
integrative capacity could undo the early splitting and

produce unified, ambivalently experienced internalized
representations of both self and significant objects- -a

precondition of the more developmental ly advanced depressive

position (Klein, 1955)
Unfortunately, the schism between followers of Klein

and those of Anna Freud delayed recognition of Klein's
important theoretical contributions in the areas of
7

splitting, projective identification and introjective

identification- -particularly after Anna Freud failed to

mention any of these processes in The Ego and the Mechanisms
of Defence, originally published in 1936 (Freud, 1948)

Loyalty to Anna Freud, combined with abhorrence of some of
the more sensational

(and often implausible)

aspects of

Klein's theories, led many of Klein's critics to dismiss her
ideas outright

(Jones,

1950)

Margaret Mahler, who like Klein worked primarily with

young children, also conceptualized early splitting as a
normal process, attributing adaptive, as well as defensive

functions to it. Her theory of the subphases of separation-

individuation stipulated a normal period of splitting in

which internal self and object representations are firmly
distinguished from one another (Mahler, Pine & Bergman,
1975)

.

Ego psychology and the British object relations school

thus concluded that the most essential component of reality

testing- -the ability to distinguish internal from external
stimuli- -was itself a function of normal developmental

splitting (Blanck & Blanck, 1974)
Kernberg's elegant litmus test for distinguishing

character disorders, psychotic conditions, and neurotic
conditions is relevant here. Two key questions must be
answered. First, is the patient's reality testing intact?
Second,

is the patient characteristically dependent upon

8

"primitive" defenses such as splitting?
1988)

(Kernberg,

1984,

These questions address the degree to which the

patient's normal developmental splitting of childhood was

ultimately resolved. Did the patient retain the split

between self and object, and did the patient mend the
developmental split in self- and object-representations?

Borderline Splitting

In the borderline literature,

"splitting" usually

refers to the phase- inappropriate and excessive use of

splitting defenses clinicians commonly see in adult

borderline patients. Kernberg (1975,

p. 29)

provided the

classic definition of intrapsychic splitting as the "active

process of keeping apart introj ections and identifications
of opposite quality"

.

Together, contradictory cognitions and

affects comprise the "opposite quality" of split

introjections and identifications.

Kernberg (1975) claimed that when splitting persists
too long in childhood,

it short-circuits neutralization of

aggressive and libidinal drive, thereby depriving the ego of
the sort of moderated and focused energy needed for

continuing psychic development. Continually buffeted by

untempered drive derivatives (e.g., wishes, fantasies,
primitive impulses, etc.) associated with the split selfand object-representations, the ego is unable to establish
9

a

consistent frame of reference from which to mediate between
the immediate demands of drive and the ultimate constraints
of reality. Kernberg's "ego weakness" refers to the varied

impairments of ego function that ensue as developmental
failures cascade upon one another.

Discussing adult character disordered psychiatric
patients whose cognitive representations of self and objects

usually remain split. Kernberg (1975,

p. 29)

noted that:

The direct clinical manifestation of splitting may be
the alternate expression of complementary sides of a
conflict in certain character disorders, combined with
a bland denial and lack of concern over the
contradiction in his behavior and internal experience
by the patient... Probably the best known manifestation
of splitting is the division of external objects into
"all good" ones and "all bad" ones, with the
concomitant possibility of complete, abrupt shifts of
an object from one extreme compartment to the other;
that is, sudden and complete reversals of all feelings
and conceptualizations about a particular person.
Extreme and repetitive oscillation between
contradictory self concepts may also be the result of
the mechanism of splitting.
The rapidity and massiveness of the switches from one
split perspective to another is what makes borderline

patients so memorable to their therapists. Consider one of

Harold Searles' patients who told him "You deserve the
Congressional Medal of Spit." As Searles (1986, p. 501)
noted,

"The first seven words of that eight-word sentence

conveyed heartfelt admiration; but the last one, said with
no break at all in the rhythm of her speech, was uttered in

unalloyed contempt

.

10

Unlike psychologically healthy adults, who may split
selectively, and even adaptively on occasion, severe

borderline splitting is essentially uncontrolled and
pervasive. Whereas a healthy person may split off relatively
small portions of self- and object -representations, the

borderline splits self- and object-representations into

wildly contrasting halves.
The problem with the borderline,

in other words,

is

structural. Severe borderlines do not, at a basic level,

have any conception of the self or objects as whole
entities, with both good and bad aspects. They sometimes

experience themselves as a "good self" and sometimes a "bad
self"

.

Likewise, they experience significant objects

sometimes as "all good", sometimes as "all bad."
As Kernberg (1975) noted, we rarely, if ever, see pure
splitting, even with severe borderline patients; instead,

this defense combines with infantile forms of idealization

and projection, projective identification, denial,

omnipotence and devaluation. Acting synergistically with one
another,

such operations severely undermine cognitive

mediation of extreme affect and impulsivity, and make
realistic object relations impossible. The combination of

splitting and projective identification is especially

damaging to borderline patients because it tends to
reproduce, in the real relational world, the same chaos and

distortion characterizing internal object relations.
11

In The Primitive Edge of Experience,

Thomas Ogden spent

considerable time outlining the theoretically and
experiential ly amorphous boundary between what might be

considered purely intrapsychic splitting processes and their
inevitable interpersonal sequelae:

Splitting defensively renders object-related experience
of a given emotional valence (for example, the
relationship of a loving self to a loving object)
discontinuous from object -related experience of other
valences (for example, the relationship of a hating
self to a hating object)
Each time a good object is
disappointing, it is no longer experienced as a good
object- not even as a disappointing good object- but as
the discovery of a bad object in what had been
masquerading as a good one. Instead of ambivalence
there is the experience of unmasking the truth. This
results in a continual rewriting of history such that
the present experience of the object is projected
backward and forward in time creating an eternal
present that has only a superficial resemblance to time
as experienced in a... Imore conventional! mode...
Rewriting of history leads to a brittleness and
instability of object relations that are in continual
states of reversal (Ogden, 1989, p. 19).
.

It

takes little imagination to envision the

destructiveness of such a phenomenological position in the
interpersonal realm. In a study of severely ill borderline

patients Greene, Rosenkrantz and Muth (1986,

p. 256)

noted

that
By means of splitting operations, good and bad,
idealized and devalued, internal objects are forcefully
dissociated from each other; the borderline's
internalized social schemata are thought to consist of
rigidly dichotomized and polarized categories- pleasing
and need-satisfying versus threatening and need
thwarting - of interpersonal experience. To reinforce
these emotionally crude distinctions, loved and hated
internalized objects are continuously and massively
projected onto and into different segments of the
current social field... the borderline basically is not
12

invested in the painstaking work of discovering the
reality of actual social objects; the paramount need is
to find external figures capable of being transformed
magically and immediately, via projective endowments,
into the good and bad, protective and haunting objects
of the borderline's internal world...

Viewing objects alternatively as all good or all bad,
and lacking more subtle cognitive schemata with which to

realistically appreciate actual objects, borderline patients
essentially try to make the world conform to their sense of
reality so as to maintain some sense of order,

predictability and meaning for themselves. Through such
unconscious mechanisms as projective identification,

borderline patients often manage to induce in real objects
the very affects, moods,

impulses,

fantasies, and other

cognitions unconsciously "disowned" through splitting
(Cashdan,

1988; Ogden,

1982,

1986,

1989;

Scharff

,

1992)

.

A

re traumatizing positive feedback loop results as the

borderline's unrealistic split self- and object -schemata,
and the behavior they give rise to, unwittingly induce
reactions in the interpersonal field which reinforce the

borderline's distorted view of that field.
One well known example of splitting acting in

conjunction with projective identification occurs in the

phenomenon referred to as "staff splitting" of inpatient
hospital staff by borderline patients. In "staff splitting"
by the
a number of unit workers are unconsciously induced

borderline patient, through projective identification, to
ego.
act out certain split-off aspects of the borderline's
13

Some staff members,

for example, may find themselves

experiencing the split-off rage of the patient, toward whom
they may assume a rather punitive position. Other staff
members, at the same time, may find themselves experiencing

an overwhelming need to protect and defend the patient.

Unless the situation is correctly diagnosed as a

manifestation of the patient's projective identifications,
the situation may easily escalate to the point at which
staff spend increasing amounts of time passionately

disagreeing about which treatment approach to follow. They

may even sabotage each other's work (Gabbard, 1989).

Detecting Splitting

Students of splitting have thusfar taken four general

approaches to the problem of detecting splitting- which like

many other intrapsychic processes can only be inferred on
the basis of observable behavior.

The first method, the clinical method,

is the oldest of

the four approaches and the most crucial in

psychotherapeutic work. The clinical approach is exemplified
by the clinician who infers the operation of splitting after

observing rapid and dramatic shifts in a patient's expressed
attitude toward significant objects or the self (for
example, recall the quote from Searles' patient)

14
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An important advantage of the clinical method of

detecting splitting is that it allows the possibility of a
clinician becoming aware of splitting almost immediately,
thereby making timely intervention conceivable. Assuming
that the clinician has become well attuned to the various

nuances of the patient's dynamics and communications, the
clinical method may also achieve high reliability and

validity in particular clinical situations.
Unfortunately, reliaJDility cannot be assumed in every
case. There are at least three important problems. First,

there is the issue of calibration. What degree of change in
one's expressed attitudes toward self or others is required

before it is reasonable to infer a splitting operation? What
one clinician hears as a disjunctive shift in emotional tone

and attitude (suggestive of splitting) might be perceived by

another clinician as less disjunctive and more suggestive of

ambivalence
Second, verbally communicated manifestations of

splitting are probably influenced to some extent by such
things as the splitter's educational level and the degree to

which the splitter has been socialized to speak strong
thoughts directly, or to withhold them.
Finally, countertransf erence is notoriously powerful in

work with patients who split frequently. When splitting is
or
combined with projective identification and idealization

devaluation of the therapist, the clinician's own
15
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narcissistic needs and vulnerabilities may be directlytapped. Sometimes,

in such cases,

splitting goes undiagnosed

while the clinician resonates uninsightf ully with the

patient's distorted views of him or her.
In summary,

the clinical method of detecting splitting,

dependent as it is on the training and experience of the
clinician, the quality of the relationship between the

patient and clinician, the vicissitudes of the clinician's

attention to the possibility of splitting, and many other

variable and essentially unquantif iable factors, must be
considered insufficiently rigorous for serious scientific
purposes
The second general method for measuring splitting

involves the use of self -administered scales, like that

developed by Gerson (1984) to identify people with a
characterlogical propensity for splitting, Gerson'
scale (Table

1)

,

s

14 item

based on her survey of splitting literature

in ego psychology and self psychology,

included items

designed to assess such things as separation of good and bad
images of self and other, anger,

and Kernberg's (1975)

idealization, grandiosity,

"identity diffusion", all

theoretically linked to splitting.

An interesting and iir^ortant aspect of Gerson 's scale
(or any self -administered defense scale)

is that it requires

subjects to be aware of manifestations of what is largely an

unconscious defensive operation. Citing Kemberg (1975) and
16

Kohut (1971), Gerson (1984, p. 158) addressed the issue
directly,

stating that "self-report is an appropriate mode

of assessing the defense of splitting because the

manifestations of the defense, such as shifting object
evaluations, are part of awareness, although the purpose

served by the shifts is not."

Gerson (1984) carried out preliminary psychometric
assessment of the scale and found scale scores positively

associated with a scale measure of narcissistic personality
and negatively associated with a self-esteem measure.

Glassman (1986) performed additional psychometric work,
concluding that seven items were superfluous
in the revised scale are flagged in Table

.

Items retained

1.

The Gerson scale is not intended to detect particular

instances of splitting, but only to measure people's

proclivity for splitting. If found reliable and valid, such
a scale has importance in research as a tool with which to

discriminate frequent and infrequent splitters. This is how
it was used in the current study,

and additional evidence

was produced supporting its validity in Study

2.

A third general approach to measuring splitting is
exemplified by the Lerner and Lerner (1982) Rorschach scale.

Believing that the natural ambiguity of the blots would
elicit characteristic defensive reactions in susceptible
subjects,

the Lerners thought that splitting would manifest

in several ways. For example,

in a Rorschach response

17
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Table

1.

*

.

Gerson's (1984) splitting scale.

(Not at all true)

12

3

4

5

6

7

(Very True)

hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb."
When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten."
My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people
It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
5.
It's very painful when someone disappoints me.'
6.
7
I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their
children
Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
8.
There are times my wife (husband) /girlfriend (boyfriend)
9.
seems as strong as iron, and at other times as
helpless as a baby.
I often feel that I can't put the different parts of my
10.
personality together, so that there is one me."
11.
I sometimes feel my love is dangerous.
12.
When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I
really dislike."
13.
It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm
depressed ."
14.
Some people have too much power over me."
1.
2.
3.
4.

I

)
)

)
)

)

)

.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

"Item retained in Classman's

(1986)

revised scale.

"an implicitly idealized figure" could be "tarnished or

spoiled by the addition of one or more features or an

implicitly devalued figure" could be "enhanced by the

addition of one or more features..." Alternatively, a
response might involve "two clearly distinguished figures"

with "each figure... described in a way opposite to the
other:

'two figures,

a man and a woman. He is mean and

shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there
and taking it.'"

(Lerner & Lerner,

18

1982, pp. 85-86).

.

Table

1.

.

Gerson's (1984) splitting scale.

12

(Not at all true)

3

4

5

6

7

(Very True)

hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb."
When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten.'
My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people
It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
5.
It's very painful when someone disappoints me."
6.
I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their
7
children
Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
8.
There are times my wife (husband) /girlfriend (boyfriend)
9.
seems as strong as iron, and at other times as
helpless as a baby.
I often feel that I can't put the different parts of my
10.
personality together, so that there is one me.^
I sometimes feel my love is dangerous.'
11.
12.
When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I
really dislike.'
13.
It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm
depressed.'
14.
Some people have too much power over me."

1.
2.
3.
4.

I

)
)

)

)

)

)

.

)

)
)

)

)

)

)

)

'Item retained in Classman's

(1986)

revised scale.

"an implicitly idealized figure" could be "tarnished or

spoiled by the addition of one or more features or an

implicitly devalued figure" could be "enhanced by the

addition of one or more features..." Alternatively, a
response might involve "two clearly distinguished figures"

with "each figure
other:

..

.

'two figures,

described in a way opposite to the
a man and a woman. He is mean and

shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there

and taking it.'"

(Lerner & Lerner,

18

1982, pp. 85-86).

.

.

administering a Rorschach correctly and reliably requires
considerable training and practice. Second, the

administration itself can be fairly time consuming, and is
usually done with one subject at a time. Third, reliable
scoring of a Rorschach protocol using the defense scales
requires additional training and practice. These factors
alone make the use of the Rorschach impractical for most

research purposes
There is also one important theoretical problem in

using any projective measure. In the words of Rapaport,
Gill,

& Schafer

(1975,

p. 224),

the projective hypothesis,

upon which all projective interpretation is ultimately
based,

is essentially the idea that "manifestations of the

human being's behavior, from the least to the most
significant ones, are revealing of his personality." The

validity of this hypothesis is far from universally
accepted. Thus, studies relying too heavily upon Rorschach
measures, or other projective test data, suffer a loss of

credibility among many scientifically oriented

psychologists
Greene, Rosenkrantz and Muth (1985) exemplify a fourth

means of measuring splitting, focusing more on interpersonal
than intrapsychic splitting. Here, evidence of interpersonal

splitting is used to infer intrapsychic splitting. The
to
researchers asked members of a borderline therapy group

/badness in
judge themselves on the dimension of goodness
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relation to other group members, and then asked them to
evaluate the group coleaders
The key finding was that the more a patient rated

him/herself as bad in relation to the rest of the group the

greater was the tendency to rate the cotherapists

differentially on a number of personal dimensions. This
suggests that the more extreme the view of the self on the

good/bad dimension, vis a vis other people with whom one is
interacting, the more likely it is that one will use also

evaluate others more extremely on salient dimensions.
Interestingly, Morrison, Greene, & Tischler (1985)

demonstrated that mental health professionals in Tavistock
group training show the same tendency to evaluate group
leaders differentially. The Tavistock results can be

interpreted as reflecting interpersonal and intrapsychic
splitting, only if one makes the additional assumption that
the (presumably) mentally healthy mental health workers

split defensively,

in response to the extraordinary stress

of the Tavistock process

(Bion,1959),

rather than for deeper

structural reasons. That is, they regressed to splitting

under the pressure of group processes, rather than splitting
being a common feature of their psychic life.
This assumption is not implausible, but does suggest
the importance of distinguishing evidence of splitting in

discrete circumstances and evidence of splitting in a

broader context due to characterlogical issues.
21
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Self -Schemata

Although not typically interested in splitting, per

se,

social psychologists have long studied the development,

maintenance, and implications of strongly held views of the
self and others. In her landmark study of self -schemata

Hazel Markus (1977, p. 63) noted that:
The quantity and variety of social stimulation
available at any time is vastly greater than a person
can process or even attend to. Therefore, individuals
are necessarily selective in what they notice, learn,
remember, or infer in any situation. These selective
tendencies, of course, are not random but depend on
some internal cognitive structures which allow the
individual to process the incoming information with
some degree of efficiency. Recently, these structures
for encoding and representing information have been
called.
schemata. .The influence of cognitive
structures on the selection and organization of
information is probably most apparent when we process
information about ourselves. A substantial amount of
information processed by an individual (some might even
argue a majority of information) is information about
the self, and a variety of cognitive structures are
necessarily involved in processing this information.
It is proposed here that attempts to organize,
summarize, or explain one's own behavior in a
particular domain will result in the formation of
cognitive structures about the self or what might be
called self -schemata. Self schemata are cognitive
generalizations about the self, derived from past
experience, that organize and guide the processing of
self -related information contained in the individual's
social experiences
.

.

.

.

From this view self -schemata play a fundamental role in

shaping one's constantly evolving sense of reality as it
relates to the self, by influencing what one attends to,
what one encodes in memory, and the inferences drawn from

environmental events (Markus & Nurius, 1986)
22

To test her ideas, Markus (1977) asked subjects to rate

how dependent they were. She defined subjects who rated

themselves extremely dependent, or extremely independent as
schematic on the dependent /independent dimension, and others

who rated themselves more moderately as aschematic.
She then demonstrated, among other things, that being

schematic (at either extreme) significantly increased the

efficiency with which judgments about the self on the
schematic dimension were made. She concluded that people can

make much more confident judgments about the self, more
rapidly, when queried about schematic dimensions, rather

than dimensions which are, for them, aschematic,
Markus' conclusions about the information processing

advantages of self -schema use have generally been supported
by other research. Most notable, perhaps, is the work of

Kuiper (1981)

,

who had subjects rate how much each of a

series of adjectives did or did not describe the self, on a
9-point scale'. Later, subjects were asked to make a

dichotomous judgment whether each adjective was like or
unlike them, and response time was recorded. The essential
finding was that response latencies were considerably

shorter for adjectives rated extremely on the 9-point scale,
The
that is, as very much like the self or unlike the self.
as the
same pattern, which Kuiper graphically referred to

Kuiper treats self as a prototype, rather than a
for some
schema, a technical difference of importance
purposes, but not here.
'
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"inverted-U RT effect", held when subjects were asked to
judge another person according to the same adjectives.

Two important conclusions follow. First, people find
it easiest to recognize near-perfect

(and thus obvious)

matches between the self -concept and adjectives used to
describe it, or extremely bad (and likewise obvious)
mismatches, but require more information processing effort
in judging cases that fall between the extremes. Second,

people most efficiently judge others on dimensions most
salient to their own sense of self.

What is important is self -concept

,

not the "objective

self". Self -schemata are not necessarily accurate

representations of the self; they do not need to be in order
to have significant information processing effects. That is,

people process information about the self based on whatever
self -representations are dominant, and these may or may not

bear a lot of resemblance to more objective representations
of self.

This simplifies the problem of determining how

schematic people are on given dimensions. We do not need to

measure how dependent a person really is to judge his or her
schematicism on the independence/dependence dimension.
Rather, as noted by Fiske and Taylor (1991, pp. 183-184), we

only need to ask him or her:
There are several criteria for deciding if someone has
a schema (is schematic) or has no schema (is
aschematic) on a particular dimension of his or her
24

self concept. People are self -schematic on dimensions
that are important to them, on which they think of
themselves as extreme, and on which they are certain
the opposite does not hold... Thus, if independence is
important to you, and if you think of yourself as
extremely independent and as not at all dependent, that
implies that you have accumulated considerable
knowledge about yourself on that dimension. For
example, you should be certain that you would never ask
for help setting up your stereo, even at the potential
cost of damage to it or harm to yourself... In contrast
to schematics, aschematics are not invested in, or
concerned about a particular attribute. They rate the
trait as low to moderately self-descriptive, and
perceive it as low to moderate in importance. Of
course, people who are aschematic on one trait may well
be schematic on others; everyone has some dimensions of
self that are idiosyncratically salient.

The second experiment of the present research uses the

three criteria mentioned by Fiske and Taylor for determining
the degree to which subjects are schematic on a variety of

dimensions. The first two criteria, the degree to which

subjects rate themselves extreme on a dimension and the

degree to which they find that dimension personally
significant, logically apply equally well to frequent and

infrequent splitters.
However, even though the third criterion (disavowal of

the opposite trait)

seems eminently appropriate in judging

garden variety schematicism, its applicability in evaluating

schematicism of split dimensions requires some discussion.

Although the classic sort of self -schema described by
Fiske and Taylor is unipolar, self-concept in borderline

splitting is bipolar. That is, in the case of a classic
self-schema a person endorses one extreme end of a selfdimension, and never endorses the opposite extreme. In
25

characterlogical splitting, on the other hand, both
extremes
are endorsed, though not at the same time.
It has long been noted by clinicians,

however,

that

borderline patients are quite capable of acknowledging
aspects of self opposed to the currently activated side of

a

split, when confronted, but give the opposing aspects no

emotional, and thus no practical weight (Kernberg, 1975;

Masterson,

1976)

.

Because splitting does not make aspects of self opposed
to the currently activated side of the split entirely

unconscious (Masterson, 1976)

,

the decision to apply the

third Fiske and Taylor (1991) criterion hinged on the

following logic: admission of the inactivated side of a
split, which generally occurs in response to confrontation
in clinical situations,

represents at least a partial

failure of the splitting defense. The purest cases of

splitting should involve denial, to a considerable degree,
of the inactivated side of the split.

Thus, by including the third criterion in my

measurement of schematicism on dimensions reputed to be
important among frequent splitters (borderlines being the

most frequent splitters)

,

I

hoped to detect the most robust

instances of splitting. As described in chapter

chapter

3,

2

and

the questions subjects answered to yield my

overall measure of schematicism were posed prior to other

experimental manipulations or challenges.
26

I

used this

.

procedure to maximize the chance that measured schematicism
on global dimensions signified by such words as good,
bad,

loving, and hateful would reflect characterlogical

splitting, rather than atypical splitting resulting from

unusual stress caused by the experimental procedures

themselves
It should be re-emphasized,

however,

that denial that

the opposite ever holds is not necessarily a stable feature
of schematicism in borderline splitting. This means that the

concept of schematicism, as formally defined by Fiske and

Taylor (1991)

,

may only apply within certain parameters in

the case of borderline subjects.

Complexity of Self -Representations

The Fiske and Taylor (1991) quotation implies that
self -schemata apply to somewhat limited dimensions of self.

As a corollary, one can infer that a person can be schematic
on several relatively independent dimensions. For example,
it is possible to be a schematic sports fan,

a schematic

Democrat, and a schematic gourmet, with each schema

remaining fairly independent of the others.
In order to conceptualize borderline splitting in terms
of self -schemata, however,

one must imagine that the

dichotomous self -schemata are a great deal more global. That
is,

rather than having the normal complement of reasonably
27

independent self -schemata associated with circumscribed

dimensions of self, the borderline is conceptualized as
having two alternatively activated, self -schemata, both

of

which are relatively all -encompassing.
By all -encompassing

I

mean that the good and bad self-

schemata of the borderline subsume most other aspects of
self. This implies that they are also salient in most life

situations. Although a great many life events have no

relevance to a Democrat self-schema, or a sports fan selfschema, almost any life event has potential relevance to a

hypothetical good self -schema or bad self -schema.
Linville (1985, p. 95) described people as having

complex representations of self or others when they organize

self-knowledge "in terms of a greater number of aspects that
are relatively independent of one another." She then

demonstrated that complexity of self- or otherrepresentation is associated with less extreme evaluations
of self and others,

and less affective extremity. In her

view more complex representations serve to buffer
evaluations and affect by providing a framework for

integrating discrepant bits of information about self or
others (Linville, 1982, 1985, 1987).
The borderline good self- and bad self -schemata must be

considered simple representations in Linville 's sense,
because they involve two global evaluations, with but one
active at any given time. To the extent they subsume any
28

less global aspects of self, the more circumscribed
aspects
of self-representation are,

by definition, highly correlated

under the good or bad rubrics. According to Linville's
theory,

the simple self -representations we see with

borderlines should result in extreme evaluations of the self
as well as extreme affect associated with such appraisal.

Affect and Self - Schemata

The literature dealing with depressive self -schemata
(e.g.,

Beck,

1979; Kuiper et al

.

,

1985)

exemplifies a

broader effort to understand emotions from

a

cognitive

perspective. From this perspective the affect elicited by an
event depends as much upon personal "meaning-making" as the

event's objective aspects.
Beck's (1979, p. 84)

"cognitive triad" of depression,

which he implicates in the development of most depressive
disorders,

includes "a negative conception of the self, a

negative interpretation of life experiences, and a

nihilistic view of the future." The cognitive triad is
pertinent to the present study because the "negative

conception of the self" is essentially a self-schema which
is associated quite closely,

in Beck's view, with a

particular affective experience.
Fiske (1982) empirically demonstrated the close linkage
of affect and certain schemata by showing that when a schema
29
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is activated,

the affect associated with it is also

triggered. One must be careful not to assume that the

opposite necessarily holds, however. In the normal situation
a particular affect could be associated with any number of

schemata, and one couldn't reasonably expect affect to

trigger a particular schema just because the schema

triggered the affect. What works in one direction may not

work in reverse
The situation in borderline splitting is hardly normal,
however. Here the world and the self are split into two

overarching categories- -good and bad. Given this, it is not

unreasonable to expect euthymic mood (i.e., positive or
"good" mood)

to trigger the good schema,

and dysthymic mood

the bad schema. If, as Linville (1987) noted, the less

complex a person's sense of self, the larger the proportion
of self-aspects likely to be affected by an emotionally

salient event, a borderline's simple sense of self should be

massively affected by any induced mood change.
This fits current wisdom regarding borderline patients.

After noting that borderline individuals are subject to
emotional dysregulation, characterized by a low threshold
for emotional reaction,

intense emotional reaction once the

threshold is passed, and a slower than normal return to
emotional baseline, Linehan (1993) emphasized that strong

emotion narrows attention to mood- congruent information, so
that cognitions tend to fall into line with strong affect.
30
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This suggests that once strong affect is
triggered

borderline,

i

splitting is liable to occur; the good self o

the bad self is elicited or reinforced. Whether the
split

will necessarily be mood congruent, or defensively mood

incongruent (with the mood congruent side of the split

perhaps projected onto an object) is not so certain,

however

Splittin g and Self -Schemata

The present research grew out of the idea that

splitting can be understood as a process in which opposing
self -schemata are alternatively activated. A related premise

holds that any splitting (even if it is not of the

alternating borderline variety) involves activation of a
self -schema
In social cognition an active self -schema is believed

to manifest in both the willful

(i.e.,

conscious) and

automatic (i.e., unconscious) behavior of a person. In the
willful realm, as noted above, a person acting schematically
will overtly identify him or herself as extreme on schematic
dimensions, will assert the personal importance of this

identification, and will also assert that an opposite

identification does not hold true.
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Two methods were employed in the two studies described

below to tap the conscious side of self -schematicism. First,
subjects were asked to locate themselves on scales

representing a trait of interest. This provides a measure of
a subject's extremity of self -concept on that trait

dimension. Second, subjects were asked to judge, as rapidly
as possible, whether trait adjectives presented on a

computer monitor were best characterized as me or not me.

A person should also show automatic (unconscious)
improvement in ability to process schema- related information
in comparison with aschematic information. In the second

experiment of the present study subjects were asked to
"guess" whether subliminally presented trait adjectives did

or did not describe them. Because they remained consciously

unaware of the words presented, significant variance from a

random response pattern on particular terms provided one

measure of automatic improvement in information processing,
in this case manifesting as an improved ability to "guess"

consistently, presumably in congruence with an underlying

schema which had primed them to respond nonrandomly.

Lowered response latency in me /not me judgments about
adjectives presented on either subliminal tasks or
superliminal tasks was treated as another potential

indicator of improved information processing.
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Summary

In this chapter

outlined the historical development

I

of the concept of splitting in the psychoanalytic tradition,

and distinguished between normal developmental splitting and

borderline splitting.

I

then described several general

methods which have been used to detect splitting for
clinical or research purposes.
Next

I

discussed the concept of self -schemata from the

social cognitive school, with emphasis on improvements in

information processing associated with the use of selfschemata. Finally,

I

speculated that splitting can be

usefully described in terms of extreme, global, and
alternating self -schemata
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CHAPTER

2

STUDY ONE

In the fall of 1993

I

conducted pilot research intended

to accomplish two primary goals:

1)

to explore the use of

mood inductions as a means of inducing splitting, and

to

2)

consider the usefulness of inconsistencies in selfevaluation, under contrasting moods, as a marker of

splitting
In this chapter

I

describe the experiment in detail,

present and analyze the results, and discuss changes in

experimental design prompted by the mixed results

General Hypotheses

Assuming that splitting could be provoked in
susceptible subjects using the mood induction procedure

described by Parrott (1991), described in detail below,

I

expected the splitting to manifest as inconsistency in
judgments about the self -descriptiveness of adjectives after
subjects experienced contrasting mood inductions. The

general logic is simple: if splitting involves a switch from
one self -schema to another then judgments about the self-

descriptiveness of trait terms central to those selfschemata should vary as the schemata alternate.
34

.

Because frequent splitters (as determined by the Gerson

Splitting Scale) were expected by definition to split more
than infrequent splitters during the experiment, as a result
of contrasting mood inductions,

I

also predicted that

frequent splitters would show more inconsistency than those

identified as infrequent splitters.

Another major hypothesis was that subjects identified
as frequent splitters would rate the self -descriptiveness of

trait adjectives in a more extreme fashion than subjects

identified by their Gerson scale scores as infrequent
splitters.

I

based this hv'pothesis on the supposition that

people who split characterologically (and thus with greatest
frequency) have simple bipolar self -representations and

consequently evaluate self and others in a more extreme way.
Note that extremity of self-rating is not necessarily

indicative of schematicism on a trait, because the rating

may reflect the view that one is entirely unlike a trait.

Henceforth

I

will use the term schematic to refer to

situations in which a trait is strongly endorsed as selfdescriptive,

the term antischewatic to refer to situations

in which a trait is strongly denied to be self-descriptive,

and the term aschematic in situations in which a trait is

neither strongly endorsed as self-descriptive nor denied as
self-descriptive
Finally,

I

hypothesized that frequent splitters would

splitters, whei
tend to respond more rapidly than infrequent
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asked to judge the self -descriptiveness of the terms good
and bad, on the theory that these terms tap the extreme,

contradictory self -schemata which should be more
characteristic of frequent than infrequent splitters.

Methods

In this section

I

describe the experimental procedures

in detail

Sampling

Study

1

and Study

assistants and
Thus,

I

I

2

were labor intensive, requiring my

to spend about an hour with each subject.

found it necessary to limit the experimental sample

to the smallest size offering reasonable statistical power.

Because frequent splitting is an uncommon characteristic in
the general population, however, a small random sample would

have yielded few, if any, frequent splitters. Thus,

I

employed disproportional stratified sampling to yield two
subsamples with extreme scores on the splitting scale.

Thanks to a prescreening process psychology majors are

required to undergo, we were able to administer the revised

Gerson scale (Glassman, 1986) to more than 1,000
undergraduates
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Prescreening data were written to an SPSS file on the

University's mainframe computer.

I

sorted and stratified

these student records by Gerson scale score, and combined
the highest strata with the lowest, the next highest with
the next lowest, and so on. In this way

I

generated new

strata of scores ranging from most extreme (high and low) to

most moderate.

I

retained only the most extreme strata for

further use, randomizing records within strata.
I

produced a list of student names and phone numbers,

with no indication of Gerson scale score (other than degree
of extremity)

.

My assistants and

I

called students in the

order they were listed, and asked them to participate in an
experiment^

.

The only substantive information we provided

about the experiment was that it involved putting oneself in
the mood suggested by certain pieces of music. More than

fifty students agreed to participate but only 39 ultimately

participated (19 frequent splitters and 20 infrequent
splitters)

.

The rest failed to show up as scheduled.

Study Procedures

A researcher met with individual subjects for
approximately an hour in a small quiet, windowless
'

A separate list of all potential subjects, sorted by

phone number, was maintained, checked regularly throughout
not
the sampling process to insure that roommates were
hearing
sampled. This was a precaution against subjects
about the experimental design before coming m.
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experimental room in Tobin Hall, at the University of
Massachusetts. The room was furnished with two chairs and a
desk. Items on the desk included a computer monitor and

keyboard hooked up to an IBM type PC, a cassette tape deck,
and a pair of stereo headphones capable of playing

prerecorded cassette tapes with a high degree of fidelity.
We asked subjects to read and sign an informed consent

form which explained, among other things, that there was
some small risk they might experience unforeseen effects as
a result of the mood induction procedure. All subjects

signed the release. We then oriented them to the equipment
on the desk.
In particular, we directed their attention to a cover

which fit over the keyboard in such a way that only two
groups of function keys and another set of keys labelled

with the digits from
of function keys,

1

to

9

were accessible. The first group

comprised of four horizontally aligned

keys, was labelled not me on the keyboard cover. A second

group of four horizontally aligned function keys, located
five inches to the right of the first group, was labelled

me
Thus, we explained,

subjects would be able to respond

not
me by pressing any one of the four keys so labelled, or
keys.
me by pressing any one of the other four accessible

We started the computer program and it prompted

adjectives
subjects to indicate the degree to which various
38
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did or did not describe them, using the digit keys from
9

(with

1

1

to

indicating complete rejection of the adjective as

self-descriptive and

9

representing complete endorsement of

the adjective). Gough's (1952) Adjective Check provided 14
of the 36 adjectives used in this study, with others

suggested by friends and colleagues who helped test the

computer program (Table

Table

2.

2)

Adjectives used in Study one.

Ambitious"
Assertive*
Athletic
Attractive*
Bad
Believable
Careful
Clumsy
Confident*
Emotional*
Generous*
Good

Happy
Humble

Sinful*

Impulsive*
Insecure
Intellectual

Smart
Stable*
Stupid
Thin

Kind*

Timid*

Liberal
Moral
Nervous*
Rational*
Right
Sad

Ugly
Unworthy
Wanted

"Derived from Gough (1952)

Weak*

Well -liked
Wrong

.

It should be emphasized that this was a rather

primitive measure of schematicism, incorporating only the
first of the three Fiske and Taylor (1991) criteria for

determining whether a person is schematic on a given
dimension.

During a pause in the computer program, we asked
to
subjects to listen carefully to a musical selection, and

All
put themselves in the mood suggested by the music.
this time
subjects heard Delibes' Mazurka from Copp^lia, at
39

(Delibes et al

.

,

1989). This music,

lasting approximately

four and a half minutes, was intended to induce happy mood.

Musical mood induction is one of several approaches

taken in recent research to alter the mood of experimental
subjects (Clark, 1983; Kenneally, 1988)

.

Parrott (1991)

specifically validated Delibes' piece for happy mood
induction and Prokofiev's stark Russia under the Yoke of the
Monguls,
Nevsky,

from the soundtrack of Eisenstein's Alexander
for sad mood induction (Prokofiev et al

.

,

1987).

The computer program was restarted and subjects were

then instructed to judge, as rapidly as possible, whether
the adjectives they would soon see on the screen did or did

not describe them, and to respond either me or not me by

pressing an appropriate key. The computer displayed the
adjectives against a black screen in white letters 1.3 cm
high,

from a distance of approximately 61 cm. Adjectives

were presented in unique random order for each subject, one
at a time,

for a maximum of

6

seconds. After

6

seconds the

computer scored the response missing and cycled to the next
adjective. The computer automatically recorded response

latency and direction of successful responses.
Next,

on the basis of random assignment unknown to the

experimenter until that moment, subjects listened to a
repeat of the Delibes piece or, if the subject was assigned
to the experimental,

contrasting mood induction condition,

to Prokofiev's Russia,

under the Yoke of the Monguls.
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The latter piece was not played as half speed, as

Parrott (1991) presented it to his subjects, because this

would have extended its normal three and three quarters
minutes length to seven and a half minutes, exceeding the
time which could be allotted for mood induction. Even at

regular speed the music is grimly evocative, as aptly

described by music reviewer Steven Ledbetter (1987, p.3)
The film opens on a scene of desolate empty steppes
littered with signs of past battle. Prokofiev's musical
equivalent of this desolation is a keening melody
played in unison, four octaves apart, with noting but
emptiness in between. The oboes' lamenting tune suggest
poignant loss, while the rapid turn figure in the muted
violas and violins is an image of the feather-grass
blowing on the hillside- -the only thing moving.

Following the second mood induction, subjects repeated
the adjective task, with adjectives presented in a new

random order. Again, the computer recorded direction of
response and response latency. After this we administered
the happy mood induction to subjects who had received the

sad mood induction. We debriefed all subjects fully, paying

special attention to any emotional changes the subjects

reported (Appendices B and

C)

fipg^cific

.

We then dismissed subjects

Hypotheses

Specific hypotheses tested in this study are listed
discussed.
below, their rationale having already been
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Hypothesis

1

Hypothesis

1

states that the mean consistency rate of

me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects with high

Gerson scale scores than subjects with low Gerson scale
scores

Hypothesis

2

Hypothesis

2

states that the mean consistency rate of

me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects in the
experimental condition than subjects in the control

condition

Hypotheses 3a and 3b

Hypothesis 3a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low

Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the

9

-point scale

on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term good.

Hypothesis 3b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low

Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the

9

-point scale

on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term bad.
42
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b

Hypothesis 4a predicts subjects with high Gerson scale
scores will respond quicker in making judgments about the
trait adjective good than subjects with low Gerson scores.

Hypothesis 4b predicts subjects with high Gerson scale
scores will respond quicker in making judgments about the
trait adjective good than subjects with low Gerson scores.

Results

This section presents experimental results pertinent to
the hypotheses.

Hypotheses

1

and

Hypothesis

2

1

states that the mean consistency rate of

me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects with high

Gerson scale scores than subjects with low scale scores.
The 39 subjects produced 1342 usable pairs of matched

adjective responses, one response to the adjective following
the first mood induction, and one following the second mood

induction (an additional 62 pairs of responses were spoiled

by nonresponse to the adjective on one or both trials)

.

We

scored these pairs as consistent if both responses were
Trial
identical, or inconsistent if there was a change from
1

to Trial

2
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Figure

compares the mean consistency rate of me/not

1

me judgments by subjects with low Gerson scores and subjects

with high Gerson scores. This difference of means is in the
direction predicted by hypothesis

1.

The differences are not

statistically significant, however (t(22.1)= -1.055, p=.l5),
and the null hypothesis for Hypothesis
In examining the data,

I

1

cannot be rejected.

discovered that some

response times for me/not me judgments were so short (e.g.,
one was only

2

ms

!

)

that they called into question the

legitimacy of the consistency score for that item. Removing
items from analysis if subjects responded in less than 100

ms yielded a mean consistency rate of .93 for infrequent

splitters and .86 for frequent splitters, a difference

closely approaching significance {t(25.3)= -1.565, p=.065).
Hypothesis

2

states that the mean consistency rate of

me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects in the
experimental condition than subjects in the control
condition.

Figure

2

compares the mean consistency rate of me/not

me judgments of subjects in the control condition versus
those in the experimental condition. The difference of means
is in the direction predicted in hypothesis 2, but the

results are not statistically significant
p=.20)

.

(

t (23

.

1) =

.

831,

Taking out of analysis responses of less than 100 ms

did not appreciably alter observed mean differences or their
statistical significance.
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Figure

3

depicts the combined effects of propensity for

splitting and experimental condition on the consistency rate
of me/not me judgments. Despite the fact that the trend

appears precisely that predicted by Hypothesis

Hypothesis

2,

1

and

none of four means differ to a statistically

significant degree when contrasted in pairs.
It may seem surprising that having observed an almost

statistically significant difference between the consistency
rates of frequent and infrequent splitters, we would fail to

approach significance when contrasting the most different

mean consistency rates of subgroups of the frequent and
infrequent splitters. The explanation is simple: as the size
of contrasted groups declines so does the power of the t-

test as an inferential tool

.

An observed difference of means

which approaches significance when N=29 is liable to be far
from significant when N is only half that large.
In retrospect, the experimental arrangement, and the

nature of the data, did not permit sufficiently powerful
statistical testing; one would normally expect mean

differences of the magnitude observed above to achieve
statistical significance. Although 39 subjects would be

sufficient for many research designs, the large variance of

many variables in the present data set, and the allotment of
power of
subjects to four distinct groups, combine to reduce
the statistical procedures available here.
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Figure 3 Mean me/not me
consistency rate by subgroups:
low-splitting control (LSD)
low- splitting experimental
high-splitting control
(LSE)
and high-splitting
(HSC)
experimental (HSE)
.

,

,

I

expected consistency rates to vary according to the

degree to which a trait adjective was rated as like or

unlike the self. As Figure

4,

Figure

5,

and Figure

6

illustrate, observed consistency was lower for all subgroups
in the case of traits rated moderately,

rather than

extremely. This is what prior schema research would predict;
the more schematic or ant i schematic a dimension, the more

consistent one's judgments on that dimension should be.
Table

3

presents the mean consistency rates of me/not

experimental
me judgments of trait adjectives by the four

groups for adjectives originally rated antischematically
like the
unlike the self (ratings of 1-3), schematically
47

self

(ratings of 7-9)

,

or aschematically (ratings of 4-6)

.

In addition to reflecting a tendency for lowest consistency

to occur in judgments of aschematic traits, the table shows

that the range of the means differed most for adjectives

rated aschematically or schematically.

However t-tests failed to find any of the group
means significantly different from any other. In addition to
the problem of relatively small

N,

noted above, the power of

the t-test suffers in a case like this by the loss of

variance information which occurs when a summary dependent
variable is constructed from other variables in the raw
data,

especially when the latter represent repeated

measures. In this study subjects made two me/not me

judgments about each trait adjective and the consistency
rate refers only to the average congruence of judgments

involving all 36 trait adjective stimuli.
Some of the stimuli are of more theoretical interest

than others, given the earlier discussions of borderline

splitting and the tendency for borderlines to form good and

bad self -schemata. Wondering if important intergroup
differences in the consistency of responses to the terms

good and bad were being swamped by variance in the overall
consistency rate attributable to other terms,

I

examined the

good and bad responses in isolation. It turns out that
subjects with low Gerson scale scores were perfectly
bad.
consistent in their responses to the terms good and
48
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However, the consistency rates for the frequent splitting
subjects,
.84 and

in the control and experimental conditions, were

.83,

respectively.

It was obvious from mere observation of the group

means that the experimental condition could not have had

much impact on consistency, because both the infrequent
splitting subgroups had identical mean consistency rates and
the two frequent splitting subgroups had means that were

very close.
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Table 3 Mean consistency rate of me/not me judgments
for the four experimental groups, by degree to which a trait
adjective was originally rated as like the self.
.

Groups

Adjective Rating

Largest
Difference

LSD

LSE

HSC

HSE

Schematically Unlike the .94

.95

.94

.88

.07

.89

.79

.82

.78

.11

.99

.97

.94

.87

.12

Self

(1-3)

Aschematically

(4-6)

Schematically Like the
Self

Due to the lack of variance in two of the four subject

groups

I

could not perform an Analysis of Variance CANOVA)

Therefore,

I

used linear regression to test the effect of

propensity for splitting on the consistency rate for the
terms good and bad. In a regression equation (as opposed to

an ANOVA equation)

it made sense to use the actual Gerson

scale score as the independent variable, rather than the
less informative dichotomous variable for designating the

Gerson score as high or low. The results of the regression
are presented in Table 4."

These results provide some support for a restricted

version of hypothesis

1,

suggesting that high Gerson scorers

that
A t-test was conducted to test the hypothesis
and high Gerson scorers,
is different for low Gerson scorers
p«.025.
producing similar results: t(18)= -2.0497,
fi

*
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Table 4. Results of regression of consistency of me/not me
judgments for the words good and bad on Gerson splitting
scale score.

Variable

B

Constant
Gerson Score

-.003

N=39

J?'=.107

R=.39

.97

SE

Beta

.043
.001

One
Tail
p

T
22.804
-2.101

.000

-.326

.000
.021

tend to be somewhat more likely than low scorers to respond

inconsistently to the global traits good and bad.
In view of the fact that the

of

.107 is not

especially large, two observations are important. First, the
sample for this study represents a nonclinical population.
The prediction of greater inconsistency of me/not me

judgments involving the good and bad terms was derived,
essentially, from the borderline literature. Thus, there is

reason to expect one would achieve a higher

and lower p

if the regression was performed using a clinical subsample.

Second, high and low Gerson scorers differ

significantly in consistency rates of me/not me judgments of
the terms good and bad but the difference in consistency

rate for all trait terms is not significant. This provides

additional evidence that although the inconsistencies in

good and bad responses were few in number, they were
meaningful, and not simply due to random error.
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Hypotheses 3a and

?>h

Hypothesis 3a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low

Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the

9

-point scale

on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term good.

Hypothesis 3b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low

Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the

9

-point scale

on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of

the trait term bad.

To test these hypotheses

from the midpoint of the

9

I

measured subjects' deviation

-point rating scale on which they

indicated the degree to which they saw themselves as like or

unlike a trait. An overall deviation score

(D)

was

calculated simply as: D= L |x-5|, where x equals the rating
a subject gave a particular trait adjective.

Because D measures deviation from the midpoint in a
linear manner, three instances in which a subject deviates

by one from the midpoint contribute as much to D as a single

response deviating by three points. Thus, D does not

necessarily capture occasional deviation of large magnitude.
To accentuate the most schematic responses,

another measure:

=

L

I

constructed

{x-5)^ with the subscripted s in

referring to the squaring of differences.
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The direction of results, as reported in Table

5,

opposes the predictions of Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b.

Subjects with low Gerson scores had higher D and
than those with high Gerson scores (values for

scores

and two

t

tailed p are included for reference only)
Table

5

has several interesting features. First, note

that the magnitude of mean difference for

trait adjectives,

D^,

under all

is sufficiently large that if

I

had

correctly predicted the direction of the difference it would
be statistically significant under the single tailed

criterion (p would then equal .041 instead of .082)
same is almost true for

D,

.

The

where p would equal .055 under

single tailed criterion, assuming the differences were in
the predicted direction. Thus, the results suggest that low

Gerson scorers actually rate themselves as more like or more
unlike many diverse trait adjectives than high Gerson
scorers

Hypothes es 4a and 4b

Hypothesis 4a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will respond more rapidly in making judgments

about the trait adjective grood than subjects with low Gerson

scores
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Table 5. Mean values of D and
scale score groups.

for the low and high Gerson

Good and Bad

All Trait Adjectives

Group

D

Low Gerson
Scores

2

.

605

8

.

026

2

High Gerson
Scores

2

.263

6

.263

1

tj, =

1.146

p=.259

.

.

151

6

.239

943

5

.239

1.636
p=.110

1.256
p=.217

tj, =

t,, =

1.788
p=.082

t,, =

Hypothesis 4b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will respond more rapidly in making judgments
about the trait adjective bad than subjects with low Gerson

scores
The test of hypotheses 4a and 4b involved comparison of

three measures:

1)

the response latency for rating the trait

terms on a nine point scale,

2)

the response latency for

and
trait terms during the first set of me/not me judgments,
3)

response latencies for the third set of me/not me

judgments. Results are presented in Table

Contrary to hypotheses 4a and

4b,

6.

the mean reaction

of low Gerson
time of high Gerson scorers exceeded that
to a statistically
scorers in every instance, although never

significant degree.
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.

Note that both high and low Gerson scorers tended to

respond more rapidly to the words good and bad than other
trait adjectives, and that high Gerson scorers tended to

respond more slowly in all tests than low Gerson scorers.

Given these facts, it made sense to test the possibility
that high Gerson scorers responded more rapidly to the words

good and bad, in comparison to the baseline provided by all

Table 6. Mean reaction times (ms) to the words good and bad,
and all trait adjectives, on various rating and judgment
tasks
Low Gerson
Scores

High Gerson
Scores

Nine Point Rating
of all Trait
Adjectives

2590

3186

Nine Point Rating
of good and
bad

2491

3052

First Me/Not Me
Judgment of all
Trait Adjectives

1022

1086

First Me/Not Me
Judgment of good
and bad

850

988

Second Me/Not Me
Judgment of all
Trait Adjectives

938

1042

Second Me/Not Me
Judgment of good
and bad

843

972

Variable
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Table 7. Ratios formed by dividing the mean reaction times
for the terms good and bad by the mean reaction times for
all other trait adjectives.

Task

Low Gerson
Scorers

High Gerson
Scorers

Nine Point
Rating

.961

.958

First Me/Not Me
Judgment

.832

.910

Second Me/Not Me
Judgment

.899

.933

other trait adjectives, than low Gerson scorers. Table

7

provides the observed ratios of average reaction time for
the words good and bad in comparison to reaction times for

other adjectives.
None of the differences in reaction ratios are

statistically significant, or approach significance, and in
two of the three cases high Gerson scorers in this study had
a higher observed ratio than low Gerson scorers. This

unexpected result could be due to the previously noted fact
that high Gerson scorers in my sample rated the words good

and bad less extremely than low Gerson scorers. As shown in
Figure

7

and Figure

8,

reaction times for all adjectives on

terms were
the me/not me judgments tended to be highest when

lowest
rated near the middle of the nine point scale, and

Kuiper's
when the terms were rated extremely, replicating
(1981)

"inverted-U" finding.
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The question this raised was whether high Gerson

scorers might have actually reacted more quickly to the
terms good and

Jbad

than low Gerson scorers, controlling for

extremity of initial adjective rating. Table

8

sheds light

on this question. It compares frequent and infrequent

splitters in terms of the ratio formed by dividing the

reaction time for the first me/not me judgment of the words

good and bad by the average reaction time for all adjectives
on the same task, with results organized according to

whether subjects initially rated the words good and bad
schematically or antischematically (deviating by

3

or

4

points from the midpoint on the nine point scale) or

aschematically
As Table

8

indicates,

the infrequent splitters had

lower observed ratios in all categories, except for the word

good when it was schematically rated. None of the
differences of means between frequent and infrequent
splitters, within categories of schematicism and word, were

statistically significant.
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Figure 7. Mean reaction time
on the first me/not me
judgment task, for all
subjects, by rating of
adjective's descriptiveness of
the self.
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the self.
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Ratios formed by dividing the mean reaction times
for the words good and bad by the mean reaction time for all
trait adjectives on the first me/not me judgment task, by
degree of schematicism on the good and bad dimensions.

Table

Word

8.

Schematic or
AntiSchemat ic
Rating

Gerson
Score

n

Aschematic
Rating

n

good
Low
High

.688
.652

Low
High

.641
.834

12
7

.601
.815

7

.735
.026

9

11

bad
10
9

1

10

Discussion

Hypothesis

1

predicted that subjects with high Gerson

scale scores would show more inconsistency in me/not me

judgments than low Gerson scorers. This received limited
support from the fact that the observed differences in mean

consistency rate closely approached statistical significance
when responses under 100 ms were removed from analysis.
Also,

good
the regression of consistency rate for the words

that
and bad on actual Gerson scale scores, indicated

dimensions
consistency of self -judgment on the good and bad

declines as tendency to split increases.
The results did not support Hypothesis

2,

which

condition would
predicted that subjects in the experimental
in the control
have lower consistency rates than subjects
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condition. This may be partly due to the fact that the

dichotomous nature of the control variable could not be
circumvented, in the same way that the dichotomous

assignment of subjects to low or high Gerson scale score
status was overcome in the regression equation when actual
scale scores were used as the independent variable.

Inferences to a larger population aside for a moment,
the mean consistency rates observed in the four subsamples
(Figure

3)

did follow the pattern predicted by Hypothesis

and Hypothesis

2

.

1

It appears that the large variance in the

consistency variable reduced statistical power to the point
where even big observed differences of mean provided little
basis for inference. Thus, there is some reason to remain

optimistic that the null hypotheses associated with

Hypothesis

1

and Hypothesis

2

might be rejected in a more

powerful experiment
On the other hand, observed differences of means failed
to offer any support at all for Hypothesis 3a or Hypothesis
3b. Thus,

there is no evidence that high Gerson scores in

the population is associated with a greater likelihood of

rating the adjectives good and bad self -schematically or
antischematically. However, because there are other features
on
of schematicism than those measured by simple self-rating
a dimension
3

(Fiske and Taylor,

1991)

,

the test of Hypothesis

does not constitute a complete test of the general

hypothesis that frequent splitters are more schematic or

antischematic on the good and bad dimensions. This

deficiency of Study

1

is directly addressed in Study 2,

where all three of the Fiske and Taylor (1991) criteria are

used in assessing schematicism.
Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b received no support
from the present results. There is no evidence that high

Gerson scores in the population are associated with lower
reaction latencies in making conscious me/not me judgments
about the terms good or bad.
The most elegant interpretation of these results is
that the high Gerson scorers were no more schematic or

antischematic on the good/bad dimension than low Gerson
scorers. Thus,

they did not rate the words

grood or Jbad

more

extremely self-descriptive and did not respond to them more
rapidly. The lower consistency rate in me/not me judgments,
in this view might be due to something other than splitting,

such as a more muddled sense of self, or a greater tendency
to respond to subtle demand features of the experiment.

Given the weak power of the present experiment,
however, and the incomplete measurement of schematicism,

seems premature to draw any firm conclusions.

Study

1

I

it

critiqued

with the goal of improving power in a follow-up

experiment to retest the original hypotheses and a few
additional ones.
One problem, the large variance between the individual

consistency rates of subjects, can only be remedied to the
62

extent that this variance includes error. The part of the
sample variance which reflects real variance in the

population is inevitable in any sample, but sample variance
due to measurement errors could potentially be reduced.
In Study

1

a subject responded to each adjective once

in each me/not me judgment trial. Thus, a single response

error could make what would have been a consistent response
inconsistent, or vice versa. If, in contrast, a subject

responded several times to each adjective, simple response
errors would contribute less to variance in overall

consistency rate, or consistency rate for a given adjective.

Another way to tame the large variances in consistency
rates would be to sample more subjects, taking advantage of
the fact that N and n serve in the denominator of the

formula for standard error. Unfortunately, practical

considerations made 40 subjects the maximum number that
could be included in an experiment like this one.
Study

1

did not include a manipulation check other than

some discussion during debriefing about the impact of the

music upon the subjects' mood. Some subjects reported having

entered the mood of the music and described their feelings
about the music in some detail, but many subjects reported
that they had experienced little mood change. Unfortunately,
this information was not systematically gathered.

Interestingly, a number of subjects reported being

sufficiently alarmed by the language of the informed consent
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form that they later believed they had resisted mood

induction without really intending to do so.
Thus,

Study

1

is open to the criticism that it failed

in some cases to induce the intended moods and that it is

now impossible to sort out where mood induction worked and
where it did not. This criticism is directly relevant to

interpretations of data relating to Hypothesis

Hypothesis

2

1

and

because the dependent variable for the test of

these hypotheses (consistency rate) involves a measure taken

after the second variable mood induction. The tests of
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, in contrast, involved data
taken prior to any mood induction, and two of the three

measures used to test Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b were
taken before the variable mood induction.

Another problem with this experiment, relevant only to
the test of Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b, involves the

reliability of time measurements using the internal timer of
the PC. The technical issues are detailed in Appendix A.

Here it should be noted that although timing error was a

major source of variance in all the timing data it could at
least be treated as random error. Thus, even if timing error

lowered the power of statistical tests it did not bias them.

Another criticism of Study

1

deals with the fact that

it only employs transparent measures of self -judgment

.

This

raises important issues. First, it increases the likelihood
expected of
that subjects understand, on some level, what is
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.

them in the study. Some subjects may tend to comply with
such an implicit demand, even as others may tend to go

against the grain of expectation.

Because the judgment tasks are all aimed at subjects'
conscious sense of self, there is also

a

likelihood that

simple desire to maintain a consistent self-image entered
the equation for some subjects. Consistency of self-image is

apparently important for most people, in life as in
experimental situations (Fiske

& Taylor,

1991,

pp.

218-223)

There is no a priori reason to think that the need for
consistent self-image is any less significant to borderlines
or other frequent splitting persons, except that with

frequent splitters inconsistency is more likely to be dealt

with via splitting instead of the less dramatic methods

employed by people who do not often split. In any case, it

would be nice to have measures of current sense of self
which are not so vulnerable to either demand effects or

a

desire for self -consistency
The fact that only conscious measures of sense of self

were employed also raises an interesting theoretical point.

Although a sense of self is undoubtedly a crucial component
of many day to day decisions and judgments,

it is often

located in the cognitive background, not at front center
stage as the tasks of study

1

demand.

When one has developed a fairly inclusive, coherent,

singular sense of self, calling
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it

directly into

consciousness may make little difference to its information

processing effects. But what if one harbors two split selfimages? In this case is it not possible that by directly

bringing self -concept to the forefront of consciousness one
also increases the chance that inconsistencies between

current feedback about the self and the activated side of

self-concept will arouse partial awareness of the opposite
sense of self?

From a psychoanalytic perspective, the bringing to
consciousness of the contradiction between the activated and

deactivated self -representations represents a failure of
splitting, necessitating further defense such as denial,

isolation of affect, etc. One presumes that any such

defensive operations use up limited cognitive capacity to a
certain degree. This would impair any other mental

processing occurring at the same time (such as those
demanded by the judgment tasks of Study

1)

with slowing of

reaction a natural secondary effect.
Thus,

an additional reason for desiring measures of an

activated sense of self which does not directly call the
qualities of that sense of self into consciousness, is that

unconscious measures of self-concept are less likely to call
into play a series of other defenses which may complicate
the results.

A final criticism of Study

1

deals with the Gerson

introduction
scale, which has been little studied since its
66

in 1984. Although Glassman (1986)

examined its formal

psychometric qualities, shortening it by half as a result of
his findings, the scale has received little testing to

establish its validity. Before Gerson's scale is used again
it is desirable to see if it is associated in ways we would

expect of a splitting measure with other variables contained
in the prescreening data base.

Summary

In this chapter

I

described the procedures and

hypotheses associated with Study

1,

presented results from

statistical tests of the hypotheses, and drew conclusions

regarding the validity of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER

3

STUDY TWO

Study

2

was organized with three goals in mind:

test the validity of the Gerson scale,
of the hypotheses from Study

1,

improved statistical power, and

2)

1)

to

to retest several

or variations of them, with
3)

to test additional

hypotheses involving unconscious aspects of self -concept in
frequent and infrequent splitters.

Methods

This section describes the procedures of Study

2

Sampling

Study

2

used the same prescreening and sampling

procedures used previously in Study
Study

2

18 females)

scores

(3

to 4,

The final sample for

included 21 subjects with low Gerson scale scores

males,

1

1.

males,

(3

and 20 subjects with high Gerson scale

17 females)

.

Low Gerson scores ranged from

and high scores ranged from 20 to 25.
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study Procedures

A detailed description of procedures used in Study
2

is available in Appendix B. Only a general description of

procedures is presented here.
My assistants and

experimental room

I

conducted Study

2

in a small

at the University of Massachusetts at

Amherst. The room contained a desk, two chairs, and a single
IBM- compatible PC

.

An assistant or

I

met with each subject for the hour

the study procedures required. We welcomed students to the

study and read the informed consent form to them. Once the

form was signed, the study began.
We led subjects to falsely believe that procedures they

would undergo were intended to aid the development of a new
type of cognitive test. This deception was used to explain
the presence of speed and accuracy tests for which subjects

would receive mood- inducing performance feedback, as
outlined below and described in detail in Appendix

B.

After providing some demographic data in response to
prompts on the computer monitor, subjects were prompted by

computer to describe their current mood using a maximum of
three adjectives. Then the computer asked subjects to
selfprovide two adjectives which they considered extremely
to
descriptive and important. Subjects were also asked
a total of
provide antonyms for these two words, yielding
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two words labelling idiographic schematic traits and two

words labelling idiographic antischematic traits.
The computer then presented an increasingly difficult

reverse digit recall test and gave all subjects rigged

feedback indicating very poor performance in relation to
peers. This constituted the dysthymic mood induction. The

computer probed for mood after the induction was completed.
Next the computer directed subjects to watch a

bracketed area of the monitor and to observe masking symbols
that were flashed there. Subjects were then asked to judge

whether a succession of trait terms subliminally presented
in the masked location were better defined as me or not me.

Registering this judgment required subjects to press an
appropriate keyboard key as rapidly as possible after they
formed an "intuition" about which response (me or not me)
was best. Subjects were tested 60 times, with each of 10

adjectives being presented six times. The 10 adjectives

included the terms good, bad, loving, hateful, passive, and
assertive, as well as the four idiographic terms provided by
the particular subject.

Next the computer randomly presented the adjectives, in
a fully perceptible way,

six times each. Subjects were again

asked to make me/not me judgments as rapidly as possible.
We then showed the subjects card 9GF of the Thematic

Apperception Test (TAT) and asked them to rate the two
characters on the card on the 10 trait dimensions.
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Next we attempted a happy mood induction by having

subjects respond via computer to a sham test of their

ability to distinguish a particular symbol, in a fast and
accurate manner, from other symbols presented rapidly on the
monitor. Subjects then received rigged feedback to the

effect that they had performed very well on this test. The
tasks involving subliminal and perceptible presentation of
trait adjectives were repeated and mood was queried.

Subjects were then debriefed and dismissed.

On the Lack of a Control Group

Study

2

contained no control group. All subjects

received the same experimental manipulations (the

performance feedback) in the same order. This creates
problems in interpreting results, of course, and the

decision not to use a control group was not made lightly.
The labor intensive experimental procedure, which

required the presence of the experimenter for one hour with
each subject, made it impossible to run more than 40
subjects in the time that was available. Because half had to
be frequent splitters, and half infrequent splitters, the

projected n was 20 for each subgroup. Any further division
of the subgroups,

for example,

into control and experimental

as in
groups, would have reduced the n of subgroups to 10,

Study

1.

In Study

1

statistical power was poor, in major
71

part because of the low numbers of subjects in identifiable
subgroups. Power simply had to be improved in Study

2,

and

because most of the major hypotheses dealt with differences

between frequent and infrequent splitters, and not the
effect of manipulations, per se, eliminating the control

group seemed reasonable.
The reader should keep in mind, however, that because
of the lack of a control group in Study 2,

the idea that

manipulations caused any given effects must always be taken

with a grain of salt. Inferences about differences between
frequent and infrequent splitters, under the sort of

conditions subjects experienced in this study, stand on more
solid ground.

Scoring the Mood Data

An independent evaluator, unaware of the purpose of the
mood data, compared the blocks of mood responses from
immediately before and after the mood inductions, and judged

whether mood was more or less euthymic in the second block.
The evaluator examined responses of the 34 subjects who

showed some response variation across the four mood
enquiries. Table

9

summarizes the results.

34
It is especially noteworthy that although 23 of the

subjects reported less euthymic mood after receiving

negative performance feedback, only
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8

reported a more

euthymic mood after the positive feedback.^

This suggests

that although the first mood induction was generally

effective the second one may not have been.
Close analysis of subjects' later mood responses, and

information from the debrief ings with subjects after the
experiment,

suggest that by the time of the second mood

induction most subjects were tired (and often irritable) as
a result of paying close attention to repetitious

procedures. Any positive effect of favorable performance

feedback seems to have been diluted, and even negated, by
the fatigue which had by that point set in. This conclusion
is supported by the fact that results from the second half

of the experiment are negligible,

reflecting what appears to

be fairly random responding to the major experimental tasks.

Accordingly,
half of Study

decided not to report results from the second

I

2

in the present report.

Instead of relying on an omnibus measure of mood change
(euthymia/dysthymia)

I

grouped mood responses under four

categories: anger, boredom, anxiety, and sadness. For
example,

responses such as "annoyed",

"mad",

and "angry"

were considered indicative of anger. Appendix C lists other
terms categorized under each heading.

at
Only mood change, and not absolute euthymia is
euthymic from
issue here A subject could be judged as less
both instances
Time 1 to Time 2 and yet have responded in
a way which suggested general euthymia.
'

m
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Table 9. Number of subjects judged more or less euthymic
after the mood inductions, by overall response pattern.
More or Less Euthymic

?

At ter

Positive
r eeuDacK

11

1

1

6
\j

4.

10

no change
no change

1
1
1
-I

+

7

no change
no change
no change
no change
(all mood responses identical)*

iOLa±

23

14

5

8

6

12

+

7

4

Total

+

Total no change

'These subjects responded identically to the four mood
queries. In contrast, the 4 subjects categorized as "no
change" under both mood inductions respond differently, but
these differences were not judged more or less euthymic.

Four dichotomous variables were established to indicate

whether or not a subject expressed anger, sadness, anxiety,
or boredom in the mood inquiries temporally associated with

the first block of experimental tasks. Each variable was

coded zero if a subject gave no response indicative of the

respective affect, or a response indicative of its opposite.
Thus,

a response of "happy" resulted in a zero code under

hand,
the variable for sadness. A value of one, on the other

way.
was coded if a subject indicated "sadness" in some
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Merging Prescreenina and Study Data

The psychology department provided access to the SPSS

system file containing extensive data on each of the
hundreds of undergraduates prescreened at the beginning of
the semester,
study.

I

including the 41 participants in the present

generated a new SPSS file containing only the data

for these 41 students,

sorted it by social security number,

and imported into it the data from Study

2

This gave me access to more than 1,000 variables

generated either by the present research or by other
researchers during the prescreening administration. This was
fortuitous in that it made it possible to compare Gerson
scale scores with a borderline personality disorder scale,

and prescreening scores on the Beck Depression Inventory,
the Spielberg Anxiety Scale, and other interesting

psychological measures.

Validating the Gerson Splitting Scale

The present study's reliance on Gerson'

s

splitting

to
scale cannot be overemphasized. The scale was integral

and its
the disproportional stratified method of sampling,

validity is thus of prime importance.
I

psychometric
have already discussed Glassman's (1986)

validation of the Gerson scale. In Study
75

2

I

tested its

.

construct validity by seeing if it correlated with variables
one would expect to be associated with splitting.

Because people with borderline personality disorder
comprise one of the largest groups engaging in frequent
splitting, any scale which purports to assess predisposition
to splitting should correlate very highly with a valid

borderline scale. Thus,

I

predicted that the Gerson scale

would correlate positively with ten items most indicative of
borderline personality in the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory (Millon, 1987)

prescreening

,

also administered during

The observed correlation among all prescreened

.

subjects of .5064 (p<.01) supports the prediction.
I

also predicted that Gerson scale score would

correlate positively with Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
score and Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) score
(Spielberger, Gorsuch,

& Lushene,

1970)

.

These predictions

were based on the psychoanalytic view of splitting as an
indicator of underdeveloped defensive ability, overreliance
on "primitive" splitting-based defenses, and underuse of

more efficient defenses based on repression (Blanck &
Blanck,

1974)

.

Less efficient defenses should correlate with

greater psychological distress, including depression and
anxiety (Kernberg, 1975)
The observed correlations between Gerson scale score

and BDI

(.5189,

p<.01)

and STAI

(.6458, p<.01)

prescreened subjects support these predictions.
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for all

)

As Lerner and Lerner (1982) and Lerner (1991) noted,

intrapsychic splitting can manifest as differential

projections onto two figural percepts. Thus,

expected the

I

frequent splitting experimental group to differentiate the
two TAT characters on the

standard and

6

4

idiographic trait

terms. The results presented in Table 10 support these

predictions. Differentiation of TAT characters

computed quite simply: x=E

|

(TATj

-

TATj)

|

(x)

was

,

where TAT^ refers to the numerical score a subject's first

named

character received on a given trait dimension, and

TATj refers to the score the second named character received

on the same trait dimension.

Table 10. Results of t-tests comparing mean differentiation
of TAT characters by frequent and infrequent splitters.

Variables

mean

n

t

(se)

(df

4 .76
(1 .04)

-1 95

Gerson Group
Standard TAT
Infrequent
Splitters

6.095

Frequent
Splitters

9.150

21

.

029

(38.23)

5 .22

20

(1.17)

Idiographic TAT
Infrequent
Splitters

4 .000

Frequent
Splitters

5

.750

21

1.87

-1.76

(0.41)

(26 .42)

4.06

20

(0.91)
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045

.

The predicted covariance of Gerson Scale scores with

other indicators of splitting was fully observed, providing

construct validation for the Gerson Scale.

Retesting Hypotheses from Study One

I

1,

was able to retest several of the hypotheses of Study

although due to differences in experimental setup these

retests fall short of true replications.
As in Study

1,

I

expected frequent splitters to show

greater inconsistency than infrequent splitters in their
me/not me judgments of fully perceptible trait adjectives
following negative performance feedback versus positive

performance feedback.
In Study

1

subjects responded once following a happy

mood induction and once following either a repeat of the
happy mood induction or a sad mood induction. Consistency of
response was simple to measure; either the two responses

matched or they didn't.
In Study 2,

however,

subjects responded six times to

each perceptibly presented trait term after the negative

feedback and six more times after the positive feedback.

Allowing for some response error,

I

took the majority

response to a trait term, within a given block of trials,
represent "true" response. Consistency could then be

measured as it was in Study

1
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tc

The mean consistency rate for all trait terms was 1.0
for infrequent splitters but only .96 for frequent

splitters. This difference of means was quite close to

statistical significance (t(19)=1.71, p<.052).
This result is consistent with those for Hypothesis

1

in Study 1. The raw data from the two studies cannot be

combined directly because the data were derived using
different procedures. Nevertheless, the odds of achieving

respective p values of .065 and .052, if the general

underlying hypothesis is incorrect, must be considerably
less than either p value because the odds of getting two

results is the product of the individual probabilities, in
this case .003. Thus,

I

consider the underlying hypothesis

strongly supported by the two studies: frequent splitters
are more prone to make inconsistent me/not me judgments

under conditions of contrasting mood inductions.
Strong evidence from Study

1

persuaded me

I

was wrong

to expect frequent splitters to rate trait adjectives such
as good,

or bad, more extremely like or unlike the self than

infrequent splitters. In fact, based on results from Study
1,

I

suspected the opposite was true. If

so,

I

saw no reason

to dismiss the equally counterintuitive prediction that

infrequent splitters are more schematic on the dimensions

good and bad than frequent splitters, according to the
criteria for schematicism set out by Fiske and Taylor
(1991)

.
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were both rated fairly aschematically

.

Antonyms for the

idiographic schematic terms, and for the standard terms
loving,

good,

and assertive are almost without exception

ranked in inverse order, with negative schematicism scores.

Table 11. Trait terms ranked in descending order by mean
schematicism for all subjects.
Mean Schematicism
Score

Term
First idiographic schematic term
Second idiographic schematic term
loving
good
Assertive
Passive

14 .22
12 .61
12 .27
7 .80
2 .68

bad
Antonym for 2nd idiographic term
hateful
Antonym for 1st idiographic term

-7.54
-11.49
-12.07
-13.76

-2 .93

The predominance of idiographic terms at the extremes

and the nearly perfect symmetry of the scores suggest that

schematicism was measured here in a valid manner. Additional
support for the validity of this measure of schematicism
comes from nonlinear regression of mean reaction time for
the me/not me judgment of perceptibly and subliminal ly

presented trait terms on mean schematicism scores for the
various terms. The best-fitting regression curve resembled
Kuiper's (1981) classic
9

"

inverted-U"

and Figure 10.
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as reflected in Figure

.

2

900

Schematicism

Figure 9 Mean reaction time in
milliseconds (ms)
for the 10
stimulus adjectives presented
perceptibly for the first
time, by mean schematicism
score
,

,

CO

E

0
E

o
o
0
QC

C
CO
0

Z

10

20

Schematicism

Figure 10. Mean reaction time
for the
in milliseconds (ms)
10 stimulus adjectives,
presented subliminally for the
first time, by mean
schematicism score.
,
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As predicted, and as reflected in Table 12,

infrequent

splitters had more extreme observed schematicism scores
(i.e.,

further from zero) than frequent splitters for the

words good, bad, loving, and hateful.

(The difference of

means is statistically significant for good, loving, and
hateful, but is not quite significant in the case of

jbad.)

Differences of means were not significant for idiographic
terms or the words assertive and passive.

Table 12. Results of t-tests comparing the mean schematicism
scores for frequent and infrequent splitters, for the words
good, bad, loving, and hateful.
Trait Term

Splitting
Group
mean

Single
Tail
n

sd

t

9.429
6.100

21
20

4.52
1.55

1.81

32

.04

Infrequent -8.952
-6.050
Frequent

21
20

4.96
7.11

-1.51

34

.07

loving
Infrequent 15.333
9.050
Frequent

21
20

4.75
6.00

3.71

36

.000

hateful
Infrequent-15.333
-8.650
Frequent

21
20

4.74
5.82

-4.02

37

.000

good
Infrequent
Frequent

df

p

Jbad

Note. Separate estimates of variance used in computing
Degrees of freedom value rounded to nearest integer.
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The last aspect of Study

which

1

I

retested in Study

2

j

involved reaction time. Results of Study

1

did not confirm

the original prediction that frequent splitters would enjoy
a speed advantage in making me/not me judgments when the

words good or bad were presented perceptibly. Despite the
fact that the data of Study

2

allowed somewhat more

sophisticated testing, results still failed to confirm the
original prediction.
Once again the lack of reaction time results may be due
to the sort of timing "noise" discussed in Appendix A. This
said,

it is still worth noting that although frequent

j

splitters rated themselves significantly less schematically
on the terms good,

loving,

original expectations)

,

and hateful,

(contrary to

they did not also suffer the speed

disadvantage one would expect to flow from decreased

I

schematicism. This suggests the interesting possibility that

I

schematicism, as measured by Fiske and Taylor (1991)

,

does

not covary with less conscious measures of schematicism in
the same way it does for infrequent splitters.

New Hypotheses

The data base from Study

Study

1

2

in

Study Two

is richer than that from

thanks to the addition of tasks involving subliminal

presentation of trait terms, the TAT indicator of splitting,
hypotheses
etc. This permitted me to test several new
84

'

.

.

dealing with response differences between frequent and
infrequent splitters when stimuli are presented
subliminal ly

Hypothesis 5a. Sh

.

5c.

and

Even though frequent splitters have not been shown to

respond more rapidly to the terms good, had, loving, or
hateful when these are perceptibly presented,

I

predicted

greater speed on the subliminal tasks. This prediction was

based on speculation that activation of a self -schema would
have a more pure effect on processing efficiency when

uncomplicated by conscious considerations involved in any
self -judgment

For example, subliminal presentation of stimuli would

presumably minimize demand effects, effects based on a
desire to appear consistent, and so forth.
Also,

it seemed possible that when frequent splitting

subjects were asked to make conscious self -judgments on

schematic dimensions they became aware not only of the

currently activated side of the split but also the muted,
but not entirely forgotten deactivated side of the split. If

such a process complicated the self -judgment it would also
slow reaction time. Subliminal presentation,

I

speculated,

would avoid any such complication. Thus, frequent splitters
could conceivably show faster reaction times on the
85
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when asked to "guess" whether the consciously unperceived
word is me or not me.
These hypotheses are predicated upon the idea that

activation of a self -schema primes a person to respond to
stimuli closely associated with the schema. In the case of

subliminally presented stimuli, such priming should result
in less random judgments of self -descriptiveness

.

Thus,

if a

good self-schema has been activated, a subject should be
able to respond less randomly when asked to guess if the

subliminally presented word good is self-descriptive or not.
Nonrandomness would manifest as response
directionality- -a definite surplus of me over not me
responses, or vice versa. Using a statistical measure of

nonrandom response pattern, a statistic
the improjbajbili ty score,

I

I

created and dubbed

developed four hypotheses

predicting that frequent splitters would respond less
randomly to certain stimuli on the subliminal tasks.
Specifically, Hypothesis 6a predicts that frequent

splitters will achieve higher improbability scores for the

word good on the first subliminal task.

Hypothesis 6b predicts that frequent splitters will
the
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on

first subliminal task.

Hypothesis 6c predicts that frequent splitters will
loving on
achieve higher improbability scores for the word
the first subliminal task.
87
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Hypothesis 6d predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word hateful on
the first subliminal task.

Results
In this section

I

present results of tests of

hypotheses 5a through 6d.

Hypotheses 5a. 5b. 5c. and 5d

Hypothesis 5a states that on the first subliminal task
the frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than

infrequent splitters to the words good, relative to their

reaction time to the idiographic trait terms.
Hypothesis 5b states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent

splitters to the words bad, relative to their reaction time
to the idiographic trait terms

Hypothesis 5c states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent

splitters to the words loving, relative to their reaction
time to the idiographic trait terms

Hypothesis 5d states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent

splitters to the words hateful, relative to their reaction
time to the idiographic trait terms.
88

Table 13 lays out the evidence, showing that there is
no basis for rejecting the null hypotheses associated with

hypotheses 5a or 5b. Contrary to predictions the observed

reaction times for the words good and bad, relative to
reaction times for the idiographic terms, were actually
slower for frequent than infrequent splitters.

Table 13. Results of t-tests comparing ratios formed by
dividing mean reaction times for words good, bad, loving,
and hateful by mean reaction times for idiographic trait
terms, by splitting groups, for 1st me/not me judgment of
subliminally presented trait adjectives.
hyp:

Ratio with
Idiographic
Traits
n

Mfe ratio

*^

MiB ratio

Two
Tail

Gerson
Scale
Word Score

Average
RT (ms)

Good Low
High

1039
1389

1 .528
1 .633

21
19

.525 37

.541

Low
High

1155
1429

1.694

21
19

.656 38

.966

Loving
Low
High

1099
1272

1 .216

Hateful
Low
High

1104
1547

Bad

1 .702

t

df

P

3.37

23

.002

.908

21
19

1.190
1.140

21
19

.46

38

.325

Note. Separate estimates of variance used in computing
Degrees of freedom value rounded to nearest integer.

In contrast,

t

as reflected in Table 13, observed

relative to
reaction times for the words loving and hateful,
89

reaction times for the idiographic terms, were faster for
frequent than infrequent splitters. However, only in the
case of the word loving was this difference of speed

statistically significant. Thus, the null hypothesis

associated with Hypothesis 5c can be rejected, but not the
null hypothesis associated with Hypothesis 5d.

Hypotheses 6a. 6b. 6c. and 6d

Hypothesis 6a predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word good on the
first subliminal task.

Hypothesis 6b predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on the
first subliminal task.

Hypothesis 6c predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word good on the
second subliminal task.

Hypothesis 6d predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on the
second subliminal task.
The construction of the improbability score is
complicated, and is fully discussed for interested readers
suffice to say
in Appendix D. For present purposes it should
of achieving
that this score represents the improbability

for a given
the observed pattern of me/not me responses
90
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trait term by pure chance alone, as calculated by the

binomial theorem. The higher the improbability score the
less likely the observed pattern is due to chance alone.

Table 14 presents the average improbability weights for
frequent and infrequent splitters and a t-test of hypothesis
that

ptf,

i

ptie.

Table 14. Results of t-tests comparing mean improbability
scores for response patterns to the words good, bad, loving,
and hateful for frequent and infrequent splitters, for the
1st subliminal task

Mean Improbability Score

hyp:

Frequent Infrequent
Word Splitters Splitters

t

iitB>

Mib

df

P

14.399

5

.726

-1.87

20 .98

.032t

5.106

6

.001

.40

32 .17

.6884:

Loving 11.675

6

.510

-1.20

21

.121t

Hateful 6.055

5 .453

.42

33

.338t

Good
Bad

-

One-tailed p.
^ Two-tailed p.
t

Only in the case of the word good in the first did the

mean improbability weights differ sufficiently between
frequent and infrequent splitters to reject the null

hypothesis that

=

/^ib

•

A subject's overt schematicism on the trait dimensions
variable in determining
is a potentially important mediating
91

nonrandomness of response to any subliminally presented
trait term. Having already seen that frequent splitters

tended to rate themselves less schematically on the terms

good and

jbad

than infrequent splitters, it seemed likely

that the effect of splitting would be enhanced if

schematicism was statistically controlled.
Thus,

I

regressed improbability scores for all terms on

schematicism and splitting scale scores. In the case of the
words good and loving the effect of tendency to split was

enhanced by controlling schematicism, as reflected in Table
15 and Table 16. This shows that splitting and schematicism

were both positively associated with nonrandom responding to
the words good and loving on the first subliminal task.

Table 15. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word g^ood in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism on
the good dimension and splitting scale score.

Variable
Schematic ism2

Schematicism

-

Beta

.820

.402

.329

.000

.039

.234

.551

Splitting
Scale Score
Constant

SE

B

3

.246

3

-

t

2

.003

-

.371

.698

P

.038

.049$

.020

.9844:

2.359

.012t

.878

.386$

Total J? = .177
^
controlling
after
variable,
splitting
to
due
R'
Incremental
for schematicism =.124
,

tOne-tailed p.
Two-tailed p.
4:
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Thinking that mood might also mediate the effect of
splitting tendency on response to subliminal stimuli,

I

entered mood variables in the family of regressions of

improbability scores for the words good, bad, loving, and
hateful in post hoc analysis. At the same time,

I

considered the possibility that differentiation of TAT
characters, one indicator of splitting, would also mediate
the independent effect of tendency to split.

Table 16. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word loving in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism
on the loving dimension and splitting scale score.

Variable

B

SE

Beta

t

Schematicism^

1 .045

.381

.480

2

Schematicism

.046

.049

.143

Splitting
Scale Score

.541

Constant

.690

.228

3

.404

.846

P
.741

.0094:

930

.3594:

2 .378

.012t

179

.8594:

.

Total R = .199
Incremental i?' due to splitting variable, after controlling
for schematicism = .122
t
4:

One-tailed p.
Two-tailed p.

The entire family of regressions included 16 models,

because there were four dependent variables (improbability
hateful)
scores for the trait terms good, bad, loving, and

and
and four mood variables (anger, sadness, boredom,
93
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anxiety)

.

Thus, Bonferroni correction dictated that mood

variables achieve a p value of less than .003125 (.05/16) to
be considered statistically significant. There was only one

instance in which this stringent criterion was met: as

reflected in Table 17 the independent variable anger was

associated with a p value of .003 in the regression of
improbability score for the word good.

Table 17. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word good in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism on
the good dimension, the mood variable for anger,
differentiation of TAT characters, and splitting scale
score
SE

Variable

B

Schematicism,

.761

.357

.006

.035

Schematicism
Anger
TAT

-

24 .921
-

Splitting
Scale Score
Constanj:

9

7

Beta
.305
-

.439

.775

.664

.279

.550

.211

.873

4 .165

.023

-

.341
.370

p

t

2

.135

-.167

.0394:
8684:

.205

.0034:

-2 .381

.023*

2

.608

.006t

2

.370

.023*

3

Total R =.42
due to Splitting variable, after cont]
Incremental
for schematicism =.113
Incremental R' due to anger variable =.223

One-tailed p
* Two-tailed p
t
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Comparison of Table 15 and Table 17 is interesting
because of the dramatic increase in

from .177 to

.42,

the

difference chiefly attributable to the anger variable. Note
that the B coefficient associated with anger, like that

associated with splitting scale score, is positive,
indicating that both tendency to split and anger correlated

independently and positively with nonrandom responding to
the word good on the first subliminal task.

Interestingly, removing the independent variable

measuring differentiation of characters on the TAT card
decreased the "explanatory power" of both the anger and
splitting variables (result not shown)

.

That is, removing

TAT differentiation significantly lowered the incremental
values associated with both anger and splitting score.
In trying to understand this phenomenon

I

noted that

the coefficients associated with the TAT variable were

negative,

in contrast to the positive coefficients

associated with anger and the splitting scale score.
Furthermore, the TAT coefficients were negative before other

variables were entered in a stepwise regression, and

remained so throughout. Also,

I

noted that the explanatory

power and statistical significance of the TAT variable
increased as the anger variable and splitting scale score
were entered in a stepwise manner.
assumed
This pattern of results would make sense if one
and the act of
that nonrandom responding to the word good
95
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significantly differentiating TAT characters both expressed
a tendency to split,

and if one further assumed that doing

one lessened the need to do the other. That is, where

splitting was expressed in a strongly nonrandom response

pattern to the subliminally presented word good the
psychological need to split the TAT characters diminished.
In other words,

the more frequently a subject split,

and the angrier she was, the greater the saliency of

judgments about the "goodness" of the self. This manifested
in an increase in nonrandom responding to the subliminally

presented word good. However, an angry and frequent
splitting subject who for some reason was unable to respond

nonrandomly to the subliminally presented term (perhaps due
to a very high perceptual threshold, or boredom with the

task and resulting inattention) retained a tendency to split

after the subliminal task, and was thus more likely to find

expression in the TAT task.
Note that the temporal ordering of experimental tasks
does not actually justify entering TAT as an independent

variable in a test of improbability scores, because the
latter data were derived first in time. Thus, to test my

speculations appropriately

I

used multiple regression to

test the effects of various variables, including the

improbability weight of the response pattern to the word
of TAT
good on the first subliminal task, on differentiation

characters
96

All mood variables, splitting scale score, and measures
of schematicism for the word good were also entered if
p

value associated with them was less than

.2.

Once all

eligible items were entered, items were removed if the p
value associated with them exceeded .25. This process

resulted in the elimination of angry mood as an independent
variable. However, as reflected in Table 18, splitting scale
score was positively associated with TAT differentiation, as
predicted, but nonrandomness of response to the subliminal

word good was negatively associated with TAT
differentiation, again as predicted. However, the

incremental

value associated with the improbability score

for the word good is quite small (.03), lending little

credence to my speculation.

Summary
In this chapter

I

described the procedures and

hypotheses associated with Study

2,

presented results from

statistical tests of the hypotheses, and drew conclusions

regarding the validity of the hypotheses.
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Table 18. Results of regression of differentiation of TAT
characters on schematic rating of the word good,
improbability scores associated with responses to the word
good on the 1st subliminal task, the mood variables, and
splitting scale score, after removal of items with p values
greater than 0.25.

Variable

SE

B

Beta

t

P

Schematicism
Schematicism^

•

0260

.0187

2041

1

386

.1744t

Improbability
Score for Word
CTOnci
\-y \-/ V—
*-f

1.

on

\y X X

Ft
X.

-i-

T"c:f
ibD
X.

Subliminal Task

Boredom

5

Splitting
Scale Score
Cpnstant
R =.290
Incremental
Incremental

9

R^

.2937

-1 .973

.02814:

3.6960

.2135

1 .480

.1477t

.2771

.1157

.3634

2

.1103

1.8252

.1509

.0765

.4683

-

.395

.OlU

4 .992

.ooot

due to splitting variable = .080
due to improbability variable =,031

One-tailed p.
t Two-tailed p.
t
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CHAPTER

4

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this chapter

I

summarize the major findings, discuss

important limitations of the study, and offer suggestions
for further research in this area.

Summary of Results

The two experiments, taken together, provide fairly

convincing evidence that college students obtaining low

Gerson scale scores are likely to rate themselves more
extremely on the global trait dimensions

srood,

Jbad,

loving,

and hateful than comparable students obtaining high Gerson
scale scores

High Gerson scorers showed a greater tendency, in both
studies, to respond inconsistently to trait terms presented

perceptibly

Gerson scale scores failed to covary significantly with
reaction times for the words good, bad, or hateful on the
tasks involving either perceptible stimuli or subliminal

stimuli
Interestingly, a greater tendency to split was
on
associated with lower reaction time for the word loving

the first subliminal task.
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splitters. On the other hand, the prediction that frequent

splitters would respond more rapidly to stimuli, relative to

reaction time for idiographic traits, was not supported.
Unfortunately, the design of the second study leaves

room for interpreting the results in different ways. For
example,

subjects were asked to rate their own degree of

schematicism on the trait dimensions only once, prior to
other experimental procedures, including the mood
inductions. Thus, one could speculate that frequent

splitters failed to rate themselves more schematically

because neither of their radically opposed self -schemata had

been fully activated by environmental stimuli (e.g., a mood
induction) when the measure was made.
If one imagines a borderline for whom neither the good

self-schema nor bad self-schema has yet been activated,
sense of self may be characterized by the sort of identity

diffusion described by Kernberg (1975)

.

Such a borderline

could be conceived as existing in a temporary ego state

marked by a very vague (but not complex) sense of self

.

In

this waiting state an amorphous and impoverished self awaits

an environmental stimulus to push it towards either the good

pole or bad pole.
It is possible that the first

(unhappy) mood induction

played the role of environmental stimulus for many frequent
to a
splitters, pushing them out of the waiting condition

have primed
more schematic condition. This, in turn, would
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them to respond nonrandomly to the key words loving and good
(i.e.

schematically)

,

even though they rated themselves less

schematically than infrequent splitters prior to the mood
induction
Such speculation exposes an important flaw in the

design of the second study, namely the assumption that
frequent splitters would be as stable in their subjective

estimation of schematicism on important trait dimensions as
infrequent splitters. The somewhat greater inconsistency of
frequent splitters in responding me or not me to stimulus

words presented perceptibly, as well as general clinical

wisdom regarding frequent splitters, suggests that this
assumption is unwarranted.
Follow-up research in this area could avoid relying

upon the validity of such a dubious assumption by having
subjects rate their schematicism on key traits several times

during the course of a study. This would allow the stability
of schematicism measures to be tested.

If significant

variability was found it could be factored into data
analysis. For example, the researcher would have access to a

measure of schematicism proximate to other measures under
study.

The evidence for frequent splitters' increased

nonrandomness of response to the subliminally presented
This
words good and loving is impressive in my view.

experienced more
evidence suggests that frequent splitters
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priming on the good and loving dimensions, in turn
suggesting a greater salience of these dimensions in the

unconscious of frequent splitters. This conclusion would be
stronger if nonrandom responding covaried with relativelyfaster reaction times, but this was true only in the case of
the word loving on the first subliminal task.
I

am inclined to give greater weight to the

nonrandomness results given the problems of accuracy

associated with the timing data (see Appendix

A)

Nevertheless, the inability of this study to demonstrate

covariance of nonrandom responding and a reaction time

advantage makes it impossible to conclude that frequent
splitters acted more schematically than infrequent splitters
once their schemata were activated by mood induction.
It could be argued,

for example, that frequent

splitters responded less randomly to subliminally presented
trait stimuli precisely because they waited longer, on
average, to respond. Length of exposure to the stimuli,

rather than schematic priming, would then explain decreased

randomness of response. Testing this quite plausible

explanation of study results requires timing data more
precise than those obtained in the present studies, as well
as an

N large enough to support ANOVA models with two or

more factors
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Suggeste d Future Research

Some of the present results point to areas deserving of

further study. Other results suggest areas which should be
ignored in the next round of research in the interest of
economy. Several suggestions for making future studies more

powerful follow: first, timing data need to more precise. A
device with dedicated timing switches should be used for

recording responses, rather than the inherently less precise
PC keyboard and software interrupt system used in the

present research.
Second,

schematicism on critical dimensions needs to be

assessed more than once to permit testing of the hypothesis
advanced above regarding movement of borderline splitters
from an ego state involving aschematicism to one involving

borderline self -schemata
Third, a more powerful mood induction procedure is

needed. The musical mood induction procedure described in

Study

1

is one possibility. Another is the procedure

described by Velten (1968)

,

in which subjects are instructed

asked to
to read a series of self -referential statements and
statements.
put themselves into the mood suggested by the

effects
So as not to confound the effects of mood and
or
associated with temporal ordering of mood inductions,
in a followsimple fatigue, the ordering of mood inductions

Measures of
up study should be randomly counterbalanced.
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schematicism on significant traits need to be taken after
each mood induction to ensure that any variability is noted
and can be statistically controlled in subsequent data

analysis
Fifth,

it seems advisable to replace free- form mood

measurement with an instrument permitting subjects to be
compared more directly, and quantitatively, on significant

mood dimensions. My choice would be the Visual Analogue Mood
Scales (VAMS)

,

which requires subjects to mark positions on

lines representing the degree to which they feel tired,
anxious, despondent,
(McCormack, Horne,

sad,

happy,

& Sheather,

angry,

1988)

.

and apprehensive

The scale is quickly

administered, ensures comparable data between subjects- -and

within subjects over time if administered repeatedly.
Sixth,

an increase in N is desirable so that procedure

order can be counterbalanced to allow for more than two

dichotomous ANOVA factors without producing empty cells.
Seventh,

it would be useful to conduct follow-up

studies with a well-defined borderline subsample serving as
the frequent splitting group. This would help ensure maximal

splitting and make the issue of generalizability of results
more clearcut
Finally,

the combined length of study procedures needs

point at
to be reduced to avoid fatiguing subjects to the

from
which results become suspect. Given the sparse results
of
the procedures involving perceptible presentation
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stimuli,

they could be dropped in a future study. Their

elimination alone would cut a 55 minute study to about 40
minutes. As much as another 10 minutes could probably be

trimmed by eliminating deception and the props and

procedures it required. Fortunately, deception would not be
required to make the Velten or musical mood induction

procedures work, another advantage in adopting them.
The standard trait terms passive and assertive could be

eliminated from all tasks, as could the second set of
idiographic trait terms. This would leave

4

standard trait

terms and one set of idiographic terms, for a total of six.

Each could then be repeated ten times during the subliminal
tasks,

rather than six, with no increase in the total time

required for the procedure in Study

2,

Repeating terms ten

times would allow for more reliable estimates of reaction
time and more powerful measurement of nonrandomness of

response

Procedures for the proposed follow-up study are

summarized in Appendix

E,

which also lists hypotheses to be

tested using the cleaner data this design should yield.
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APPENDIX A
TIMING ERROR

Unable to procure the sophisticated timers usually used
in research involving very rapid reaction times, I was
compelled to use the PC as my timer. The computer program
was written so that after initial presentation of a stimulus
word a counting loop was initiated, continuing either until
a time limit was reached (in which case a nonresponse was
scored) or until an appropriate response key was depressed,
interrupting and terminating the counting loop procedure.
There were several sources of measurement error. After
timing dozens of count cycles from zero to 5,000,000, I
found that the computer averaged 65,832 cycles per second,
but calculations showed variability of as much as ±35 cycles
per second. If this variance had been accrued evenly over
the entire count cycle it would not have been problematic,
inasmuch as an error of 35/65832 seconds (.00053 seconds)
would be negligible. However, this error, attributable to
unpredictable hardware -derived delay in command execution,
was actually accrued only at the very beginning and end of
measurement. Thus, error could amount to as much as 40 ms, a
significant amount.*
Fortunately, this timing error was, for all practical
purposes, random rather than systematic. This requires a bit
of explanation. First, it is important to note that the
error is associated with the point at which a timing
interrupt was initiated in relation to where the CPU was in
its processing or "clock" cycles. This means that the error,
charted over time, would have a cyclical aspect to it. If
the CPU was at clock step 1 the interrupt could not be
enacted till after step 4, and the error would be greatest.
If, however, the CPU was nearly completed with step 4, error
would be minimal. Because the CPU cycled approximately
65,832 times per second (it took one full set of clock steps
to complete one count cycle) this means that the amount of
error which would accrue to a response varied from minimum
to maximum 65,832 times per second. Because no person
responds to experimental tasks of the sort in these
experiments with timing precision approaching 1/65,832
becomes an
seconds, the cyclical aspect of timing error here
essentially moot point, and this source of error can be
considered random.
.

.

,

.

degree of e
It should be understood that this
error
represents a maximum, and that actual observed
'

this.
test situations tended to be less than
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the latter are very short than when they are very long (an
additional reason to be suspicious of very short reaction
times)
but this nonlinearity is negligible above the 100 to
200 ms thresholds for reasonably plausible reaction
latencies. Thus, even though the large contribution of
timing error to general error variance in the reaction time
studies is unfortunate in reducing the power of the
inferential tests at my disposal, its essential randomness
means it need not be taken into further account
,
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR STUDY TWO
We welcomed subjects to the experimental room and
oriented them to the computer keyboard, particularly the
five function keys (Fl through F5) marked in red, and the
five function keys (F8 through F12) marked in green. These
keys were arranged in a single horizontal line across the
top of the keyboard.
Until this point the monitor screen was bright red with
black lettering reading as follows in order to support the

deception

AMERICAN PSYCHO -EDUCATIONAL LABORATORIES
Testing Validation and Standardization Program
for Test # 293. Sf 5 -17 is now ready to run.
(copyright 1992)
To be administered only at sites specifically
authorized by APEL.

When we began the computer program a light blue screen
with black lettering appeared. It read as follows:

Thank you for agreeing to help us standardize a new
form of cognitive testing. You and hundreds of other
students are being tested now in study centers across
the USA, using the new computerized methods you will
see demonstrated today. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)

The next screen read:
Some of the procedures will appear very much like
multiple choice testing with which you are already
familiar. However, you will be asked to respond to
these multiple choice questions as rapidly as possible.
Speed of response will be measured and used, along with
the correctness of your response, to evaluate how well
you perform on each test you take today. (Press any
GREEN key to continue)

The next screen read:
Some of the tasks you will be asked to do today will
seem quite different than anything you have ever done
before. Once the testing is over the test administrator
at your center will explain how each of these tasks is
used to create a new index of cognitive functioning.
(Press any GREEN key to continue)
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The next screen read: "Occasionally the program will
ask about your mood at that time. Knowing what your mood is
will help us evaluate your performance more objectively.
(Press any GREEN key to continue)".
The next screen read:

Before we begin testing we want to know a little about
you, and how you see yourself as a person, so we will
be able to understand our results better. Some of this
information will help us validate and standardize the
tests. Some of this information will play a role in the
tests, as you will later see. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)
Next, the computer program prompted subjects to enter
Year of birth, month of birth, day of birth, ethnic
identification and year of college.
Next, the program prompted subjects to "please think of
3 words that best describe you mood at this moment" and
asked them to enter the mood words by typing them on the

keyboard
After this a screen read as follows: "Please think of a
quality that is strong in you and important to you. (Press
any GREEN key to continue) "
The next screen read: "Now, referring to this quality
that is strong in you and important to you please finish the
."
following sentence with a single word: I am very
After subjects typed in their chosen adjective a follow-up
screen read: "Please enter the word that is the opposite of
the word x" where "x" represents the word subjects typed in
a moment before. Once an antonym was typed in the cycle was
repeated one more time, yielding four words provided by each
,

subject.
These 4 adjectives were automatically combined in a
temporary file with 6 standard adjectives used with all
subjects: good, bad, loving, hateful, assertive and passive.
Each adjective was then associated with a unique pseudorandom number generated by the program (the random number
generator being seeded for each subject with an integer
derived by algorithm from the number of seconds elapsed
This file was then sorted by the value of
since midnight)
which the
the pseudo random numbers, yielding a new file in
adjectives were uniquely ordered for each subject.'
.

Several other unique files of randomly ordered
in the
adjectives were created at the same time, for use
adjectives, so
various experimental procedures employing the
task to task, as
that the ordering of adjectives varied from
procedures (described
well as from subject to subject. Some
each adjective 6
below) required random presentation of
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The experimenter now placed a special cover over the
computer keyboard. This cover permitted access only to the
red and green function keys described earlier. This cover,
designed to limit subjects' response options to the function
keys alone, would remain in place for all remaining
procedures, with the exception of the mood checks, which
were repeated several times and are described above.
The computer now prompted the subject to answer the
following question: "How x are you?" (The x represents one
of the randomly presented adjectives.) Five responses were
possible, via the function keys: "Not x at all", "Not too
and "Extremely x"
"Average", Fairly x"
X"
Immediately after a subject responded to this question
the computer posed a follow-up question, its exact form
dependent upon the subject's first response: "How important
?" (The blank represents one
is it to you that you are
of the following phrases, in conformity with the subject's
"x to an
previous response: "Not x at all", "Not too x"
average degree", "Fairly x" or "Extremely x"
Possible responses included "Not at all important",
"Not too important", "It is of average importance", "Fairly
important", and "Extremely important". The point of these
questions was to obtain a graded measure of the degree to
which subjects viewed the adjectives self -schematically
Once this procedure was completed a new screen appeared
reading "APEL Reverse Digit Memory Test. (Press any GREEN
key to continue) " The computer was programmed to beep once
at this point in order to alert the researcher of the
beginning of the "reverse digit test."
The next screen read:
,

,

,

,

.

.

Please watch the screen carefully. A bracket will
appear for a very brief time, followed by a number,
which will also disappear after a few moments. Your job
is to observe the number, keep it in mind for several
seconds, and then indicate what the number is
BACKWARDS. The first two trials are for practice.
(Press any GREEN key to begin the test)

rather than a single time. The adjective files for
way: the
these procedures were constructed in the following
adjective at a
original file of 10 adjectives was read, one
times to another
time, but each term was then written 6
file (10
temporary file. The 60 terms on the temporary
associated with
adjectives written 6 times) were each then above Thus,
psuedo- random number generated as described value the 60
when this file was sorted by random number
terms were effectively randomized.

times,

Ill

®

.

.

We had subjects repeat back instructions in their own
words, as a way of insuring that there was no

misunderstanding
Next, a pair of white brackets, appeared centered
against an otherwise black screen. The brackets remained
visible for approximately 500 ms The screen was then blank
for approximately 500 ms A three digit number next appeared
in the space which had been previously bracketed. The number
remained visible for approximately 2000 ms The screen was
then blank for approximately 2000 ms Then five three-digit
numbers appeared at the center of the screen, each one
preceded by the name of a function key (Fl through F5)
One, and only one, of the numbers represented the
original number with the digits in reverse order. We
checked, during the first two practice trials using threedigit numbers, to make certain subjects understood how to
judge the correct answer and how to associate their answer
with the appropriate function key.
After the "practice trials" ten additional target
numbers were presented, ranging upward in size from three
digits to nine digits. During pretesting nine digits had
proved sufficient to insure failure at the task This was
important in making the negative feedback subjects received
after the reverse digit task credible
After the last reverse digit trial a screen appeared
for approximately 5 seconds reading "Please wait while the
computer calculates your performance in relation to other
students of your age."
The next screen appeared automatically, with text at
the top indicating that "this graph shows your combined
performance (accuracy plus speed) compared to other students
your age," Below the text a line stretched horizontally
across the screen, with the word "poor" labelling its left
end, the word "excellent" labelling its right end, and the
word "average" labelling the middle. A vertical line,
perpendicular to the horizontal one, and touching the latter
to the left of the word "average", roughly 1/3 the way to
the word "poor", was labelled "Your performance fell about
here. (Below Average)". This screen could not be erased
until approximately 7 seconds had elapsed, after which
additional words appeared at the bottom of the screen:
"(Press any GREEN key to continue)".
The next procedure, the so-called "intuition test", was
introduced this way by the computer:
.

.

.

.

.

.

feel
This was important because we wanted subjects to
order to enhance
they had done their best on this task, in
subjects received
the effect of the negative feedback all
task.
about their performance at the end of the
'
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Now you will take a test of INTUITION, which is
important in many types of problem solving. In a moment
you will see flashes of light on the screen. These
flashes hide words that you probably won't be able to
read at a conscious level You WILL be able to register
the words unconsciously, however. Then you WILL be able
to make guesses about the word you unconsciously
registered by using your intuition. (Press any GREEN
key to continue)
.

The next screen read:

A moment before the words are flashed you will see a
set of brackets on the screen. This is where the words
will be flashed. Please watch the brackets and flashes
carefully. Then, using your intuition, guess whether
the hidden word describes you as a person. Do not
hesitate! Make your guess as rapidly as possible! If
you guess the hidden word DOES describe you press a
GREEN key. If you guess the hidden word DOES NOT
describe you press a RED key. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)

An audible tone alerted researchers to check with
subjects at this point, to insure that the latter understood
the instructions. Based on the questions subjects asked
here, it was often necessary for us to emphasize that
subjects were unlikely to read the words that would be
flashed, and would instead have to use their "gut feeling"
to correctly guess whether the hidden word described them.
Next, the computer presented white brackets on the
black monitor screen for approximately 2000 ms, followed by
about 500 ms of blank screen. Next, to serve as
frontmasking, a sequence of twelve "greater-than signs"
(>>>>>>>>>>>>), presented for 50 ms, alternated with an
equally long sequence of "less-than signs" (<<<<<<<<<<<<)
flashed for the same length of time, over a total period of
1000 ms. Then the target word, one of ten stimulus
adjectives described above, was printed on the screen for
350 ms. Backmasking followed, consisting of the alternating
greater-than sign and less-than signs for another 1000 ms.'
,

Backmasking was necessary because the phosphors
comprising pixels on a monitor continue to glow for some
period after they are "commanded" to turn black, resulting
Backmasking
in an afterimage of unacceptable duration.
obliterates this afterimage, making the timing of
presentation reasonably precise. In extensive
experimentation prior to the study I determined that area of
frontmasking helped "subjects" focus on the correct ot
recognition
the screen, and reduced their conscious
'
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Timing started at the presentation of the target word,
and ended with either a red keypress or green keypress. A
keypress blackened the screen for 3000 ms, at which point
the next trial began. The computer automatically recorded
the nature of the response and reaction time.
At the end of the intuition procedure subjects were
once again asked to provide three words describing their
present mood. It was explained that they could use the same
mood adjectives they used before, if they wished, indicating
any change of degree with the symbols + or Next, a tone sounded and the screen went completely
blank. We intervened, informing subjects that they should
turn their chair around to face the experimenter. Subjects
were told that they would next be shown a picture and asked
to construct a story about it

Now I will show you a picture. First, I would like you
to give a name to each of the persons in the picture
Next, I would like you to tell me a story about what is
happening in the picture, beginning with what happened
before the picture, then telling me what is happening
now, and finally what you think will happen in the
future, after the scene shown in the picture.
We showed subjects card 9GF from the Thematic
Apperception Test, which Groth-Marnat {1990, p. 338)
described this way: "a woman in the foreground is standing
behind a tree. Below her is another woman running along a
beach.
I intended the TAT task to provide an independent
measure of splitting with which to compare data from the
intuition procedure. Even though normally it would be
desirable to use several TAT cards in order to detect
splitting, or any other defense, time did not allow the
administration of multiple cards. I chose card 9GF because
it depicts two characters of very similar appearance, thus
providing suitable grist for a split projection, without
pulling for it too directly.
subjects
I did not score the stories. Instead, I had
return to the computer, which first prompted them to type
questions of
a name for each TAT character, and then asked
represents
the form "How x is A?" and "How x is B?" (where x
represent the
one of the ten stimulus adjectives and A and B
respective TAT character names)

m

correctly
stimuli without affecting their ability to "guess" me or not
as
whether they had previously identified the word
study was also
me Length of stimulus presentation in thiscolleagues prior
Sased on experimentation with friends and
to the study
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Response choices were: "Not x at all", "Not too x"
"Average", "Fairly x", and "extremely x" The computer
assigned these responses numerical values from 0 to 4 and
computed the difference between A and B's scores for each of
the ten stimulus adjectives. The degree to which the
character scores differed would later be interpreted as
evidence of splitting projected onto the TAT card.
Next, the computer presented this screen text:
.

,

In order to get to know your innate response speed we
will now ask some easy questions about you as a person.
In a moment you will see descriptive words on the
screen and your task is to decide, as rapidly as
possible, whether the term describes you or does not
Please respond as rapidly as possible
describe you.
by pressing a key outlined in GREEN if the word does
describe you as a person or a key outlined in RED if
the word does not describe you. Remember: if the word
DOES describe you press a GREEN key. If the word DOES
NOT describe you press a RED key. (Press any GREEN key
to continue)
.

.

The next procedure was similar to the intuition task
except that the 60 presentations of the stimulus adjectives
were fully perceptible and no front or back masking was
used. Each term was presented in letters 1.3 cm high for as
long as 5000 ms, or until subjects pressed a red or green
key, terminating the trial. The words were presented in 3
blocks of 20 trials, with 20 second rest periods between
blocks. Again, the computer recorded responses and response
latencies
Next, the computer presented a screen reading: "APEL
LATERAL LOCALIZATION TEST PROTOTYPE". Subjects were
instructed to press one of four function keys (FX through
F4) whenever a small cross symbol was flashed on the screen,
Fl if the cross was in the leftmost quadrant of the screen,
F2 if it was in the next quadrant to the right, and so on.
The computer instructed subjects not to press a key whenever
distractor symbols were flashed.
Symbols were next presented for 1000 ms at random
locations along the horizontal line passing through the
screen's center. The researcher observed the first few key
presses to insure that subjects understood the instructions.
After 100 symbols (including 20 crosses) were presented the
screen blanked for a few seconds. Then a graph appeared,
with
identical to the one used in the reverse digit task,
that sub:ects
the exception that in this case it indicated
performance was "very good"
.
^ ^ ^v,^
the
repeated
mood,
for
queried
again
The computer
subliminal "intuition test" and the task involving
queried
perceptible stimulus adjective presentation, and
mood a final time.
.
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The computer program terminated with a tone and a blank
screen. We congratulated subjects for finishing the testing.
Still in role, we asked for feedback regarding the test
procedures. The chief purpose of this query was to give
subjects who saw through the experimental deception a good
opportunity to say so, prior to this being directly revealed
to them. No subject expressed doubt about the cover story at
this point. We asked which procedures subjects liked most
and least. Subjects typically reported liking and/or doing
well on the cross symbol test, and not liking and/or not
doing well on the reverse digit test. This provided
additional evidence that subjects did not see through the
deception
Finally, we asked what subjects thought of the
subliminal task, and most subjects reported having detected
only a few, if any words. Those subjects who reported having
detected words almost invariably reported that the word they
detected was the first schematic adjective they themselves
provided. In only two instances did subjects report seeing a
standard trait term, and then only once or twice during the
entire procedure. Thus, adjective presentation seems to have
been truly subliminal as intended.
We then informed subjects of the deception and fully
debriefed them. We took special care to make certain they
realized that their performance had never been graded in
relation to others. We then dismissed subjects.
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APPENDIX C

CATEGORIZATION OF MOOD TERMS IN STUDY TWO
Subjects in Study 2 were coded 0 or 1 on mood variables
representing anger, sadness, boredom, and anxiety. Zero was
the default value on these variables. Subjects were also
coded 0 if their mood responses gave positive indication of
not being in the respective mood (e.g., the response happy
resulted in the sadness variable being coded 0)
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for angry
mood included angry, annoyed, irritated, and mad.
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for sad
mood included depressed, somber, pessimistic, and Jblue.
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for bored
mood included bored, restless, indifferent, tired, and
unenthusiastic
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for
anxious mood included nervous, geared up, apprehensive,
anxious, hyper, timid, stressed, and u^orried.
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APPENDIX D
THE IMPROBABILITY SCORE FROM STUDY TWO

Imagine that a subject responds completely randomly to
all six subliminal presentations of a given word.
"Completely randomly" means that there is no priming effect
in operation, so that the "guess" really is a random guess.
Furthermore, complete randomness dictates an absence of any
response bias. Thus, for example, the subject cannot have an
inherent bias toward responding me or not me.
Under these conditions the expected results of
randomized responding would be equivalent to the expected
results if we flipped a fair coin for each response, heads
perhaps representing me and tails representing not me. The
binomial theorem is easy to apply in such a case. Table 19
presents the probability of achieving so many me responses
and so many not me responses, in any order, out of six
trials, the probabilities determined by the formula provided
in Blalock (1979)
N!
*

p'

*
,

r! (N-r)

where N equals the total number of trials (6 in this case)
r equals the number of me responses, p refers to the odds of
getting a me response (1/2 in this case) and q equals the
odds of getting a not me response (again 1/2 in this case)

Table 19. Binomial probabilities associated with achieving
different numbers of me and not me responses, in any order,
out of 6 trials, assuming completely random responding.

Number of me Responses
0
1
2
3

4
5
6

Probability
1/64
1/10 .666
1/4 .266
1/3.2
1/4 .266
1/10 .666
1/64
.

.
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In this unrealistically simple case note that the

probabilities are symmetrical around the most highly
expected result of three we responses out of six trials.
Testing a null hypothesis of random responding with one
subject is easy in this case, because the probability of an
observed response pattern if the null hypothesis is true
equals the probabilities at the right side of Table 19.
Thus, the only patterns which would permit us to reject the
null hypothesis of randomness would be zero we responses or
six we responses, because only these patterns are associated
with p less than .05 (p=.016, to be more precise).
In the present study the problem was not to make
inferences about individual subjects, but rather to see if
frequent splitters responded less randomly to the words good
and bad than infrequent splitters. To do so, I took the
reciprocal of the p values associated with a subject's
observed response pattern, yielding, in essence a weight
corresponding to the improbability of that subject
response pattern assuming that the responding is completely
random Averaging these weights among frequent splitters and
infrequent splitters, I obtained a measure of the average
improbability of the response patterns
Computation of improbability scores for individuals
actually required correction for response bias, because any
tendency to respond we more than not we, or vice versa,
would skew p values.
Although we have no absolute measure of response bias,
we do have a handy value with which to estimate it, namely
the proportion of we to total responses, over all
presentations of all trait adjectives in a given task. The
logic here is that because trait adjectives were paired in
opposites (e.g., good and bad, loving and hateful, etc.) the
disavowal and endorsement of adjectives should balance if
there is no response bias. Under this assumption, anything
other than a .5 proportion of we to total responses reflects
response bias. The observed proportion of we responses was
entered in the binomial equation as p, and the observed
proportion of not we responses was entered as q.
'

.
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APPENDIX E

PROCEDURE LIST AND HYPOTHESES FOR PROPOSED FOLLOW-UP STUDY

Procedures

Introduction and informed consent
Visual Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS)
Subjects provide idiographic schematic trait terms
Rating of self - schema tic ism (RSS) of trait terms
4
Happy or sad mood induction (by constrained random
5
assignment
VAMS
6
1
2
3

)

)

)

)

)

)

7

8
9

RSS

)

)

)

10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15

)

Subliminal we/not me judgment task
TAT task
Happy or sad mood induction (opposite of #4)
VAMS
RSS
Subliminal me/ not me judgment task
TAT task
Debriefing

Major Hypotheses:
Borderline subjects (BS) will show more variability in
VAMS
BS will show more variability in RSS.
2
For BS only, variability in VAMS will be positively
3
associated with variability in RSS.
BS will achieve higher improbability scores for words
4
good, bad, loving, and hateful on subliminal tasks.
Within subjects, improbability scores for different
5
trait terms will be negatively associated with reaction
time
1

)

.

)

)

)

)
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